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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 21:35:16 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-46167 — usb: usblp: fix uninitialized heap leak via LPGETSTATUS ioctl</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-46167</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usb: usblp: fix uninitialized heap leak via LPGETSTATUS ioctl&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Just like in a previous problem in this driver, usblp_ctrl_msg() will
collapse the usb_control_msg() return value to 0/-errno, discarding the
actual number of bytes transferred.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ideally that short command should be detected and error out, but many
printers are known to send &amp;#34;incorrect&amp;#34; responses back so we can&amp;#39;t just
do that.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;statusbuf is kmalloc(8) at probe time and never filled before the first
LPGETSTATUS ioctl.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usblp_read_status() requests 1 byte. If a malicious printer responds
with zero bytes, *statusbuf is one byte of stale kmalloc heap,
sign-extended into the local int status, which the LPGETSTATUS path then
copy_to_user()s directly to the ioctl caller.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this all by just zapping out the memory buffer when allocated at
probe time.  If a later call does a short read, the data will be
identical to what the device sent it the last time, so there is no
&amp;#34;leak&amp;#34; of information happening.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usb: usblp: fix uninitialized heap leak via LPGETSTATUS ioctl&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Just like in a previous problem in this driver, usblp_ctrl_msg() will
collapse the usb_control_msg() return value to 0/-errno, discarding the
actual number of bytes transferred.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ideally that short command should be detected and error out, but many
printers are known to send &amp;#34;incorrect&amp;#34; responses back so we can&amp;#39;t just
do that.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;statusbuf is kmalloc(8) at probe time and never filled before the first
LPGETSTATUS ioctl.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usblp_read_status() requests 1 byte. If a malicious printer responds
with zero bytes, *statusbuf is one byte of stale kmalloc heap,
sign-extended into the local int status, which the LPGETSTATUS path then
copy_to_user()s directly to the ioctl caller.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this all by just zapping out the memory buffer when allocated at
probe time.  If a later call does a short read, the data will be
identical to what the device sent it the last time, so there is no
&amp;#34;leak&amp;#34; of information happening.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-46167</guid>
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