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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 02:51:26 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-43334 — Bluetooth: SMP: force responder MITM requirements before building the pairing response</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-43334</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bluetooth: SMP: force responder MITM requirements before building the pairing response&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smp_cmd_pairing_req() currently builds the pairing response from the
initiator auth_req before enforcing the local BT_SECURITY_HIGH
requirement. If the initiator omits SMP_AUTH_MITM, the response can
also omit it even though the local side still requires MITM.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tk_request() then sees an auth value without SMP_AUTH_MITM and may
select JUST_CFM, making method selection inconsistent with the pairing
policy the responder already enforces.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the local side requires HIGH security, first verify that MITM can
be achieved from the IO capabilities and then force SMP_AUTH_MITM in the
response in both rsp.auth_req and auth. This keeps the responder auth bits
and later method selection aligned.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bluetooth: SMP: force responder MITM requirements before building the pairing response&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smp_cmd_pairing_req() currently builds the pairing response from the
initiator auth_req before enforcing the local BT_SECURITY_HIGH
requirement. If the initiator omits SMP_AUTH_MITM, the response can
also omit it even though the local side still requires MITM.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tk_request() then sees an auth value without SMP_AUTH_MITM and may
select JUST_CFM, making method selection inconsistent with the pairing
policy the responder already enforces.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the local side requires HIGH security, first verify that MITM can
be achieved from the IO capabilities and then force SMP_AUTH_MITM in the
response in both rsp.auth_req and auth. This keeps the responder auth bits
and later method selection aligned.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-43334</guid>
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