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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 16:44:09 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-43121 — io_uring/zcrx: fix user_ref race between scrub and refill paths</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-43121</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;io_uring/zcrx: fix user_ref race between scrub and refill paths&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The io_zcrx_put_niov_uref() function uses a non-atomic
check-then-decrement pattern (atomic_read followed by separate
atomic_dec) to manipulate user_refs. This is serialized against other
callers by rq_lock, but io_zcrx_scrub() modifies the same counter with
atomic_xchg() WITHOUT holding rq_lock.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On SMP systems, the following race exists:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU0 (refill, holds rq_lock)          CPU1 (scrub, no rq_lock)
  put_niov_uref:
    atomic_read(uref) - 1
    // window opens
                                        atomic_xchg(uref, 0) - 1
                                        return_niov_freelist(niov) [PUSH #1]
    // window closes
    atomic_dec(uref) - wraps to -1
    returns true
    return_niov(niov)
    return_niov_freelist(niov)           [PUSH #2: DOUBLE-FREE]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same niov is pushed to the freelist twice, causing free_count to
exceed nr_iovs. Subsequent freelist pushes then perform an out-of-bounds
write (a u32 value) past the kvmalloc&amp;#39;d freelist array into the adjacent
slab object.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by replacing the non-atomic read-then-dec in
io_zcrx_put_niov_uref() with an atomic_try_cmpxchg loop that atomically
tests and decrements user_refs. This makes the operation safe against
concurrent atomic_xchg from scrub without requiring scrub to acquire
rq_lock.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[pavel: removed a warning and a comment]&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;io_uring/zcrx: fix user_ref race between scrub and refill paths&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The io_zcrx_put_niov_uref() function uses a non-atomic
check-then-decrement pattern (atomic_read followed by separate
atomic_dec) to manipulate user_refs. This is serialized against other
callers by rq_lock, but io_zcrx_scrub() modifies the same counter with
atomic_xchg() WITHOUT holding rq_lock.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On SMP systems, the following race exists:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU0 (refill, holds rq_lock)          CPU1 (scrub, no rq_lock)
  put_niov_uref:
    atomic_read(uref) - 1
    // window opens
                                        atomic_xchg(uref, 0) - 1
                                        return_niov_freelist(niov) [PUSH #1]
    // window closes
    atomic_dec(uref) - wraps to -1
    returns true
    return_niov(niov)
    return_niov_freelist(niov)           [PUSH #2: DOUBLE-FREE]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same niov is pushed to the freelist twice, causing free_count to
exceed nr_iovs. Subsequent freelist pushes then perform an out-of-bounds
write (a u32 value) past the kvmalloc&amp;#39;d freelist array into the adjacent
slab object.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by replacing the non-atomic read-then-dec in
io_zcrx_put_niov_uref() with an atomic_try_cmpxchg loop that atomically
tests and decrements user_refs. This makes the operation safe against
concurrent atomic_xchg from scrub without requiring scrub to acquire
rq_lock.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[pavel: removed a warning and a comment]&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-43121</guid>
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