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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 06:40:34 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-43076 — ocfs2: validate inline data i_size during inode read</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-43076</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ocfs2: validate inline data i_size during inode read&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When reading an inode from disk, ocfs2_validate_inode_block() performs
various sanity checks but does not validate the size of inline data.  If
the filesystem is corrupted, an inode&amp;#39;s i_size can exceed the actual
inline data capacity (id_count).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This causes ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id() to iterate beyond the inline data
buffer, triggering a use-after-free when accessing directory entries from
freed memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the syzbot report:
  - i_size was 1099511627576 bytes (~1TB)
  - Actual inline data capacity (id_count) is typically &amp;lt;256 bytes
  - A garbage rec_len (54648) caused ctx-&amp;gt;pos to jump out of bounds
  - This triggered a UAF in ocfs2_check_dir_entry()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix by adding a validation check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to ensure
inodes with inline data have i_size &amp;lt;= id_count.  This catches the
corruption early during inode read and prevents all downstream code from
operating on invalid data.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ocfs2: validate inline data i_size during inode read&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When reading an inode from disk, ocfs2_validate_inode_block() performs
various sanity checks but does not validate the size of inline data.  If
the filesystem is corrupted, an inode&amp;#39;s i_size can exceed the actual
inline data capacity (id_count).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This causes ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id() to iterate beyond the inline data
buffer, triggering a use-after-free when accessing directory entries from
freed memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the syzbot report:
  - i_size was 1099511627576 bytes (~1TB)
  - Actual inline data capacity (id_count) is typically &amp;lt;256 bytes
  - A garbage rec_len (54648) caused ctx-&amp;gt;pos to jump out of bounds
  - This triggered a UAF in ocfs2_check_dir_entry()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix by adding a validation check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to ensure
inodes with inline data have i_size &amp;lt;= id_count.  This catches the
corruption early during inode read and prevents all downstream code from
operating on invalid data.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-43076</guid>
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