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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 16:16:09 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-31472 — xfrm: iptfs: validate inner IPv4 header length in IPTFS payload</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-31472</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfrm: iptfs: validate inner IPv4 header length in IPTFS payload&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add validation of the inner IPv4 packet tot_len and ihl fields parsed
from decrypted IPTFS payloads in __input_process_payload(). A crafted
ESP packet containing an inner IPv4 header with tot_len=0 causes an
infinite loop: iplen=0 leads to capturelen=min(0, remaining)=0, so the
data offset never advances and the while(data &amp;lt; tail) loop never
terminates, spinning forever in softirq context.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject inner IPv4 packets where tot_len &amp;lt; ihl*4 or ihl*4 &amp;lt; sizeof(struct
iphdr), which catches both the tot_len=0 case and malformed ihl values.
The normal IP stack performs this validation in ip_rcv_core(), but IPTFS
extracts and processes inner packets before they reach that layer.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfrm: iptfs: validate inner IPv4 header length in IPTFS payload&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add validation of the inner IPv4 packet tot_len and ihl fields parsed
from decrypted IPTFS payloads in __input_process_payload(). A crafted
ESP packet containing an inner IPv4 header with tot_len=0 causes an
infinite loop: iplen=0 leads to capturelen=min(0, remaining)=0, so the
data offset never advances and the while(data &amp;lt; tail) loop never
terminates, spinning forever in softirq context.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject inner IPv4 packets where tot_len &amp;lt; ihl*4 or ihl*4 &amp;lt; sizeof(struct
iphdr), which catches both the tot_len=0 case and malformed ihl values.
The normal IP stack performs this validation in ip_rcv_core(), but IPTFS
extracts and processes inner packets before they reach that layer.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-31472</guid>
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