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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 13:21:33 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-31471 — xfrm: iptfs: only publish mode_data after clone setup</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-31471</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfrm: iptfs: only publish mode_data after clone setup&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iptfs_clone_state() stores x-&amp;gt;mode_data before allocating the reorder
window. If that allocation fails, the code frees the cloned state and
returns -ENOMEM, leaving x-&amp;gt;mode_data pointing at freed memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The xfrm clone unwind later runs destroy_state() through x-&amp;gt;mode_data,
so the failed clone path tears down IPTFS state that clone_state()
already freed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Keep the cloned IPTFS state private until all allocations succeed so
failed clones leave x-&amp;gt;mode_data unset. The destroy path already
handles a NULL mode_data pointer.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfrm: iptfs: only publish mode_data after clone setup&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iptfs_clone_state() stores x-&amp;gt;mode_data before allocating the reorder
window. If that allocation fails, the code frees the cloned state and
returns -ENOMEM, leaving x-&amp;gt;mode_data pointing at freed memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The xfrm clone unwind later runs destroy_state() through x-&amp;gt;mode_data,
so the failed clone path tears down IPTFS state that clone_state()
already freed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Keep the cloned IPTFS state private until all allocations succeed so
failed clones leave x-&amp;gt;mode_data unset. The destroy path already
handles a NULL mode_data pointer.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-31471</guid>
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