<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 03:38:53 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-23227 — drm/exynos: vidi: use ctx-&gt;lock to protect struct vidi_context member variables related to memory alloc/free</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-23227</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/exynos: vidi: use ctx-&amp;gt;lock to protect struct vidi_context member variables related to memory alloc/free&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exynos Virtual Display driver performs memory alloc/free operations
without lock protection, which easily causes concurrency problem.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example, use-after-free can occur in race scenario like this:
```
	CPU0				CPU1				CPU2
	----				----				----
  vidi_connection_ioctl()
    if (vidi-&amp;gt;connection) // true
      drm_edid = drm_edid_alloc(); // alloc drm_edid
      ...
      ctx-&amp;gt;raw_edid = drm_edid;
      ...
								drm_mode_getconnector()
								  drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes()
								    vidi_get_modes()
								      if (ctx-&amp;gt;raw_edid) // true
								        drm_edid_dup(ctx-&amp;gt;raw_edid);
								          if (!drm_edid) // false
								          ...
				vidi_connection_ioctl()
				  if (vidi-&amp;gt;connection) // false
				    drm_edid_free(ctx-&amp;gt;raw_edid); // free drm_edid
				    ...
								          drm_edid_alloc(drm_edid-&amp;gt;edid)
								            kmemdup(edid); // UAF!!
								            ...
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To prevent these vulns, at least in vidi_context, member variables related
to memory alloc/free should be protected with ctx-&amp;gt;lock.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/exynos: vidi: use ctx-&amp;gt;lock to protect struct vidi_context member variables related to memory alloc/free&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exynos Virtual Display driver performs memory alloc/free operations
without lock protection, which easily causes concurrency problem.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example, use-after-free can occur in race scenario like this:
```
	CPU0				CPU1				CPU2
	----				----				----
  vidi_connection_ioctl()
    if (vidi-&amp;gt;connection) // true
      drm_edid = drm_edid_alloc(); // alloc drm_edid
      ...
      ctx-&amp;gt;raw_edid = drm_edid;
      ...
								drm_mode_getconnector()
								  drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes()
								    vidi_get_modes()
								      if (ctx-&amp;gt;raw_edid) // true
								        drm_edid_dup(ctx-&amp;gt;raw_edid);
								          if (!drm_edid) // false
								          ...
				vidi_connection_ioctl()
				  if (vidi-&amp;gt;connection) // false
				    drm_edid_free(ctx-&amp;gt;raw_edid); // free drm_edid
				    ...
								          drm_edid_alloc(drm_edid-&amp;gt;edid)
								            kmemdup(edid); // UAF!!
								            ...
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To prevent these vulns, at least in vidi_context, member variables related
to memory alloc/free should be protected with ctx-&amp;gt;lock.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-23227</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
