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      <title>CVE-2025-38434 — Revert "riscv: Define TASK_SIZE_MAX for __access_ok()"</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-38434</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Revert &amp;#34;riscv: Define TASK_SIZE_MAX for __access_ok()&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This reverts commit ad5643cf2f69 (&amp;#34;riscv: Define TASK_SIZE_MAX for
__access_ok()&amp;#34;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This commit changes TASK_SIZE_MAX to be LONG_MAX to optimize access_ok(),
because the previous TASK_SIZE_MAX (default to TASK_SIZE) requires some
computation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The reasoning was that all user addresses are less than LONG_MAX, and all
kernel addresses are greater than LONG_MAX. Therefore access_ok() can
filter kernel addresses.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Addresses between TASK_SIZE and LONG_MAX are not valid user addresses, but
access_ok() let them pass. That was thought to be okay, because they are
not valid addresses at hardware level.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unfortunately, one case is missed: get_user_pages_fast() happily accepts
addresses between TASK_SIZE and LONG_MAX. futex(), for instance, uses
get_user_pages_fast(). This causes the problem reported by Robert [1].&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Therefore, revert this commit. TASK_SIZE_MAX is changed to the default:
TASK_SIZE.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This unfortunately reduces performance, because TASK_SIZE is more expensive
to compute compared to LONG_MAX. But correctness first, we can think about
optimization later, if required.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Revert &amp;#34;riscv: Define TASK_SIZE_MAX for __access_ok()&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This reverts commit ad5643cf2f69 (&amp;#34;riscv: Define TASK_SIZE_MAX for
__access_ok()&amp;#34;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This commit changes TASK_SIZE_MAX to be LONG_MAX to optimize access_ok(),
because the previous TASK_SIZE_MAX (default to TASK_SIZE) requires some
computation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The reasoning was that all user addresses are less than LONG_MAX, and all
kernel addresses are greater than LONG_MAX. Therefore access_ok() can
filter kernel addresses.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Addresses between TASK_SIZE and LONG_MAX are not valid user addresses, but
access_ok() let them pass. That was thought to be okay, because they are
not valid addresses at hardware level.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unfortunately, one case is missed: get_user_pages_fast() happily accepts
addresses between TASK_SIZE and LONG_MAX. futex(), for instance, uses
get_user_pages_fast(). This causes the problem reported by Robert [1].&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Therefore, revert this commit. TASK_SIZE_MAX is changed to the default:
TASK_SIZE.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This unfortunately reduces performance, because TASK_SIZE is more expensive
to compute compared to LONG_MAX. But correctness first, we can think about
optimization later, if required.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-38434</guid>
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