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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 03:44:05 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2025-38348 — wifi: p54: prevent buffer-overflow in p54_rx_eeprom_readback()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-38348</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wifi: p54: prevent buffer-overflow in p54_rx_eeprom_readback()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Robert Morris reported:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;|If a malicious USB device pretends to be an Intersil p54 wifi
|interface and generates an eeprom_readback message with a large
|eeprom-&amp;gt;v1.len, p54_rx_eeprom_readback() will copy data from the
|message beyond the end of priv-&amp;gt;eeprom.
|
|static void p54_rx_eeprom_readback(struct p54_common *priv,
|                                   struct sk_buff *skb)
|{
|        struct p54_hdr *hdr = (struct p54_hdr *) skb-&amp;gt;data;
|        struct p54_eeprom_lm86 *eeprom = (struct p54_eeprom_lm86 *) hdr-&amp;gt;data;
|
|        if (priv-&amp;gt;fw_var &amp;gt;= 0x509) {
|                memcpy(priv-&amp;gt;eeprom, eeprom-&amp;gt;v2.data,
|                       le16_to_cpu(eeprom-&amp;gt;v2.len));
|        } else {
|                memcpy(priv-&amp;gt;eeprom, eeprom-&amp;gt;v1.data,
|                       le16_to_cpu(eeprom-&amp;gt;v1.len));
|        }
| [...]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The eeprom-&amp;gt;v{1,2}.len is set by the driver in p54_download_eeprom().
The device is supposed to provide the same length back to the driver.
But yes, it&amp;#39;s possible (like shown in the report) to alter the value
to something that causes a crash/panic due to overrun.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This patch addresses the issue by adding the size to the common device
context, so p54_rx_eeprom_readback no longer relies on possibly tampered
values... That said, it also checks if the &amp;#34;firmware&amp;#34; altered the value
and no longer copies them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The one, small saving grace is: Befor…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wifi: p54: prevent buffer-overflow in p54_rx_eeprom_readback()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Robert Morris reported:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;|If a malicious USB device pretends to be an Intersil p54 wifi
|interface and generates an eeprom_readback message with a large
|eeprom-&amp;gt;v1.len, p54_rx_eeprom_readback() will copy data from the
|message beyond the end of priv-&amp;gt;eeprom.
|
|static void p54_rx_eeprom_readback(struct p54_common *priv,
|                                   struct sk_buff *skb)
|{
|        struct p54_hdr *hdr = (struct p54_hdr *) skb-&amp;gt;data;
|        struct p54_eeprom_lm86 *eeprom = (struct p54_eeprom_lm86 *) hdr-&amp;gt;data;
|
|        if (priv-&amp;gt;fw_var &amp;gt;= 0x509) {
|                memcpy(priv-&amp;gt;eeprom, eeprom-&amp;gt;v2.data,
|                       le16_to_cpu(eeprom-&amp;gt;v2.len));
|        } else {
|                memcpy(priv-&amp;gt;eeprom, eeprom-&amp;gt;v1.data,
|                       le16_to_cpu(eeprom-&amp;gt;v1.len));
|        }
| [...]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The eeprom-&amp;gt;v{1,2}.len is set by the driver in p54_download_eeprom().
The device is supposed to provide the same length back to the driver.
But yes, it&amp;#39;s possible (like shown in the report) to alter the value
to something that causes a crash/panic due to overrun.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This patch addresses the issue by adding the size to the common device
context, so p54_rx_eeprom_readback no longer relies on possibly tampered
values... That said, it also checks if the &amp;#34;firmware&amp;#34; altered the value
and no longer copies them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The one, small saving grace is: Befor…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-38348</guid>
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