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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 20:49:07 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2023-53536 — blk-crypto: make blk_crypto_evict_key() more robust</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2023-53536</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;blk-crypto: make blk_crypto_evict_key() more robust&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If blk_crypto_evict_key() sees that the key is still in-use (due to a
bug) or that -&amp;gt;keyslot_evict failed, it currently just returns while
leaving the key linked into the keyslot management structures.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, blk_crypto_evict_key() is only called in contexts such as inode
eviction where failure is not an option.  So actually the caller
proceeds with freeing the blk_crypto_key regardless of the return value
of blk_crypto_evict_key().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;These two assumptions don&amp;#39;t match, and the result is that there can be a
use-after-free in blk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys() after one of these
errors occurs.  (Note, these errors *shouldn&amp;#39;t* happen; we&amp;#39;re just
talking about what happens if they do anyway.)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by making blk_crypto_evict_key() unlink the key from the
keyslot management structures even on failure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Also improve some comments.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;blk-crypto: make blk_crypto_evict_key() more robust&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If blk_crypto_evict_key() sees that the key is still in-use (due to a
bug) or that -&amp;gt;keyslot_evict failed, it currently just returns while
leaving the key linked into the keyslot management structures.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, blk_crypto_evict_key() is only called in contexts such as inode
eviction where failure is not an option.  So actually the caller
proceeds with freeing the blk_crypto_key regardless of the return value
of blk_crypto_evict_key().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;These two assumptions don&amp;#39;t match, and the result is that there can be a
use-after-free in blk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys() after one of these
errors occurs.  (Note, these errors *shouldn&amp;#39;t* happen; we&amp;#39;re just
talking about what happens if they do anyway.)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by making blk_crypto_evict_key() unlink the key from the
keyslot management structures even on failure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Also improve some comments.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2023-53536</guid>
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