https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 29 Sep 2026 15:38:26 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2023-53491 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute</p> <p>Back during the discussion of commit a9a3ed1eff36 (&#34;x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try&#34;) we discussed the need for a function attribute to control the omission of stack protectors on a per-function basis; at the time Clang had support for no_stack_protector but GCC did not. This was fixed in gcc-11. Now that the function attribute is available, let&#39;s start using it.</p> <p>Callers of boot_init_stack_canary need to use this function attribute unless they&#39;re compiled with -fno-stack-protector, otherwise the canary stored in the stack slot of the caller will differ upon the call to boot_init_stack_canary. This will lead to a call to __stack_chk_fail() then panic.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute</p> <p>Back during the discussion of commit a9a3ed1eff36 (&#34;x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try&#34;) we discussed the need for a function attribute to control the omission of stack protectors on a per-function basis; at the time Clang had support for no_stack_protector but GCC did not. This was fixed in gcc-11. Now that the function attribute is available, let&#39;s start using it.</p> <p>Callers of boot_init_stack_canary need to use this function attribute unless they&#39;re compiled with -fno-stack-protector, otherwise the canary stored in the stack slot of the caller will differ upon the call to boot_init_stack_canary. This will lead to a call to __stack_chk_fail() then panic.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2023-53491