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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 21:46:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-50560 — Netty susceptible to HTTP/2 Reset Attack with different on-the-wire signature</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-50560</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; netty&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty HTTP/2 max header size handling produces an attack similar to HTTP/2 Rapid Reset. There is a setting in the http2 specification called `SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE`. When a client sends that setting to Netty, it appears that Netty will behave as follows: read the request; proxy the request to the origin; attempt to produce a response; and create an exception while writing the headers for the response. Functionally, this should be similar to the http2 reset attack, but with a different on-the-wire signature. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; netty&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty HTTP/2 max header size handling produces an attack similar to HTTP/2 Rapid Reset. There is a setting in the http2 specification called `SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE`. When a client sends that setting to Netty, it appears that Netty will behave as follows: read the request; proxy the request to the origin; attempt to produce a response; and create an exception while writing the headers for the response. Functionally, this should be similar to the http2 reset attack, but with a different on-the-wire signature. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-50560</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-563q-j3cm-6jxm — Netty susceptible to HTTP/2 Reset Attack with different on-the-wire signature</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-563q-j3cm-6jxm</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: io.netty:netty-codec-http2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Netty HTTP/2 max header size handling produces attack similar to HTTP/2 Rapid Reset.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is a setting in the http2 specification called `SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE`. According to[ the RFC](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9113.html#name-defined-settings): “This advisory setting informs a peer of the maximum field section size that the sender is prepared to accept, in units of octets.”&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a client sends that setting to Netty, it appears that Netty will behave as follows:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Read the request
- Proxy the request to the origin
- Attempt to produce a response
- Create an exception while writing the headers for the response&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Functionally, this should be similar to the http2 reset attack, but with a different on-the-wire signature.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Remediation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When speaking with clients, Netty should potentially treat this as “advisory” and ignore it.  It would be best to ignore the SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE setting from clients (or ignore it when sending to clients). According to the spec, a server does not need to honor this advisory setting, and it appears that other http/2 implementations ignore it when acting as a server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a DDoS attack similar to the HTTP/2 Rapid Reset Attack.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Credit
Jonathan Looney (Engineering, Netflix)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Contact
Ashley Tolbert (Security, Netflix) - artolbert@netflix.com&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: io.netty:netty-codec-http2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Netty HTTP/2 max header size handling produces attack similar to HTTP/2 Rapid Reset.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is a setting in the http2 specification called `SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE`. According to[ the RFC](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9113.html#name-defined-settings): “This advisory setting informs a peer of the maximum field section size that the sender is prepared to accept, in units of octets.”&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a client sends that setting to Netty, it appears that Netty will behave as follows:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Read the request
- Proxy the request to the origin
- Attempt to produce a response
- Create an exception while writing the headers for the response&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Functionally, this should be similar to the http2 reset attack, but with a different on-the-wire signature.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Remediation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When speaking with clients, Netty should potentially treat this as “advisory” and ignore it.  It would be best to ignore the SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE setting from clients (or ignore it when sending to clients). According to the spec, a server does not need to honor this advisory setting, and it appears that other http/2 implementations ignore it when acting as a server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a DDoS attack similar to the HTTP/2 Rapid Reset Attack.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Credit
Jonathan Looney (Engineering, Netflix)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Contact
Ashley Tolbert (Security, Netflix) - artolbert@netflix.com&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-563q-j3cm-6jxm</guid>
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