<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 14:28:32 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-64132 — ipv6: ioam: refresh hdr pointer before ioam6_event()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64132</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ipv6: ioam: refresh hdr pointer before ioam6_event()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reported by Sashiko:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In ipv6_hop_ioam(), the hdr pointer is initialized to point into the
skb&amp;#39;s linear data buffer. Later, the code calls skb_ensure_writable(),
which might reallocate the buffer:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (skb_ensure_writable(skb, optoff + 2 + hdr-&amp;gt;opt_len))
		goto drop;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;/* Trace pointer may have changed */
	trace = (struct ioam6_trace_hdr *)(skb_network_header(skb)
					   + optoff + sizeof(*hdr));&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ioam6_fill_trace_data(skb, ns, trace, true);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ioam6_event(IOAM6_EVENT_TRACE, dev_net(skb-&amp;gt;dev),
		    GFP_ATOMIC, (void *)trace, hdr-&amp;gt;opt_len - 2);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the skb is cloned or lacks sufficient linear headroom,
skb_ensure_writable() will invoke pskb_expand_head(), which reallocates
the skb&amp;#39;s data buffer and frees the old one, invalidating pointers to
it. While the code recalculates the trace pointer immediately after the
call to skb_ensure_writable(), it fails to recalculate the hdr pointer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This patch fixes the above by recalculating the hdr pointer before
passing hdr-&amp;gt;opt_len to ioam6_event(), so that we avoid any UaF.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ipv6: ioam: refresh hdr pointer before ioam6_event()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reported by Sashiko:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In ipv6_hop_ioam(), the hdr pointer is initialized to point into the
skb&amp;#39;s linear data buffer. Later, the code calls skb_ensure_writable(),
which might reallocate the buffer:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (skb_ensure_writable(skb, optoff + 2 + hdr-&amp;gt;opt_len))
		goto drop;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;/* Trace pointer may have changed */
	trace = (struct ioam6_trace_hdr *)(skb_network_header(skb)
					   + optoff + sizeof(*hdr));&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ioam6_fill_trace_data(skb, ns, trace, true);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ioam6_event(IOAM6_EVENT_TRACE, dev_net(skb-&amp;gt;dev),
		    GFP_ATOMIC, (void *)trace, hdr-&amp;gt;opt_len - 2);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the skb is cloned or lacks sufficient linear headroom,
skb_ensure_writable() will invoke pskb_expand_head(), which reallocates
the skb&amp;#39;s data buffer and frees the old one, invalidating pointers to
it. While the code recalculates the trace pointer immediately after the
call to skb_ensure_writable(), it fails to recalculate the hdr pointer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This patch fixes the above by recalculating the hdr pointer before
passing hdr-&amp;gt;opt_len to ioam6_event(), so that we avoid any UaF.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64132</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
