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      <title>CVE-2026-46022 — misc: ibmasm: fix OOB MMIO read in ibmasm_handle_mouse_interrupt()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-46022</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;misc: ibmasm: fix OOB MMIO read in ibmasm_handle_mouse_interrupt()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ibmasm_handle_mouse_interrupt() performs an out-of-bounds MMIO read
when the queue reader or writer index from hardware exceeds
REMOTE_QUEUE_SIZE (60).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A compromised service processor can trigger this by writing an
out-of-range value to the reader or writer MMIO register before
asserting an interrupt. Since writer is re-read from hardware on
every loop iteration, it can also be set to an out-of-range value
after the loop has already started.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The root cause is that get_queue_reader() and get_queue_writer() return
raw readl() values that are passed directly into get_queue_entry(),
which computes:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;queue_begin + reader * sizeof(struct remote_input)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;with no bounds check. This unchecked MMIO address is then passed to
memcpy_fromio(), reading 8 bytes from unintended device registers.
For sufficiently large values the address falls outside the PCI BAR
mapping entirely, triggering a machine check exception.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix by checking both indices against REMOTE_QUEUE_SIZE at the top of
the loop body, before any call to get_queue_entry(). On an out-of-range
value, reset the reader register to 0 via set_queue_reader() before
breaking, so that normal queue operation can resume if the corrupted
hardware state is transient.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;misc: ibmasm: fix OOB MMIO read in ibmasm_handle_mouse_interrupt()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ibmasm_handle_mouse_interrupt() performs an out-of-bounds MMIO read
when the queue reader or writer index from hardware exceeds
REMOTE_QUEUE_SIZE (60).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A compromised service processor can trigger this by writing an
out-of-range value to the reader or writer MMIO register before
asserting an interrupt. Since writer is re-read from hardware on
every loop iteration, it can also be set to an out-of-range value
after the loop has already started.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The root cause is that get_queue_reader() and get_queue_writer() return
raw readl() values that are passed directly into get_queue_entry(),
which computes:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;queue_begin + reader * sizeof(struct remote_input)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;with no bounds check. This unchecked MMIO address is then passed to
memcpy_fromio(), reading 8 bytes from unintended device registers.
For sufficiently large values the address falls outside the PCI BAR
mapping entirely, triggering a machine check exception.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix by checking both indices against REMOTE_QUEUE_SIZE at the top of
the loop body, before any call to get_queue_entry(). On an out-of-range
value, reset the reader register to 0 via set_queue_reader() before
breaking, so that normal queue operation can resume if the corrupted
hardware state is transient.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-46022</guid>
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