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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 18:07:36 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-23114 — arm64/fpsimd: ptrace: Fix SVE writes on !SME systems</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-23114</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;arm64/fpsimd: ptrace: Fix SVE writes on !SME systems&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When SVE is supported but SME is not supported, a ptrace write to the
NT_ARM_SVE regset can place the tracee into an invalid state where
(non-streaming) SVE register data is stored in FP_STATE_SVE format but
TIF_SVE is clear. This can result in a later warning from
fpsimd_restore_current_state(), e.g.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 7214 at arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c:383 fpsimd_restore_current_state+0x50c/0x748&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When this happens, fpsimd_restore_current_state() will set TIF_SVE,
placing the task into the correct state. This occurs before any other
check of TIF_SVE can possibly occur, as other checks of TIF_SVE only
happen while the FPSIMD/SVE/SME state is live. Thus, aside from the
warning, there is no functional issue.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This bug was introduced during rework to error handling in commit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;9f8bf718f2923 (&amp;#34;arm64/fpsimd: ptrace: Gracefully handle errors&amp;#34;)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;... where the setting of TIF_SVE was moved into a block which is only
executed when system_supports_sme() is true.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by removing the system_supports_sme() check. This ensures that
TIF_SVE is set for (SVE-formatted) writes to NT_ARM_SVE, at the cost of
unconditionally manipulating the tracee&amp;#39;s saved svcr value. The
manipulation of svcr is benign and inexpensive, and we already do
similar elsewhere (e.g. during signal handling), so I don&amp;#39;t think it&amp;#39;s
worth guarding this with system_supports_sme() checks.…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;arm64/fpsimd: ptrace: Fix SVE writes on !SME systems&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When SVE is supported but SME is not supported, a ptrace write to the
NT_ARM_SVE regset can place the tracee into an invalid state where
(non-streaming) SVE register data is stored in FP_STATE_SVE format but
TIF_SVE is clear. This can result in a later warning from
fpsimd_restore_current_state(), e.g.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 7214 at arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c:383 fpsimd_restore_current_state+0x50c/0x748&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When this happens, fpsimd_restore_current_state() will set TIF_SVE,
placing the task into the correct state. This occurs before any other
check of TIF_SVE can possibly occur, as other checks of TIF_SVE only
happen while the FPSIMD/SVE/SME state is live. Thus, aside from the
warning, there is no functional issue.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This bug was introduced during rework to error handling in commit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;9f8bf718f2923 (&amp;#34;arm64/fpsimd: ptrace: Gracefully handle errors&amp;#34;)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;... where the setting of TIF_SVE was moved into a block which is only
executed when system_supports_sme() is true.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by removing the system_supports_sme() check. This ensures that
TIF_SVE is set for (SVE-formatted) writes to NT_ARM_SVE, at the cost of
unconditionally manipulating the tracee&amp;#39;s saved svcr value. The
manipulation of svcr is benign and inexpensive, and we already do
similar elsewhere (e.g. during signal handling), so I don&amp;#39;t think it&amp;#39;s
worth guarding this with system_supports_sme() checks.…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-23114</guid>
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