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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 11:58:53 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-31500 — Bluetooth: btintel: serialize btintel_hw_error() with hci_req_sync_lock</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-31500</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bluetooth: btintel: serialize btintel_hw_error() with hci_req_sync_lock&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;btintel_hw_error() issues two __hci_cmd_sync() calls (HCI_OP_RESET
and Intel exception-info retrieval) without holding
hci_req_sync_lock().  This lets it race against
hci_dev_do_close() -&amp;gt; btintel_shutdown_combined(), which also runs
__hci_cmd_sync() under the same lock.  When both paths manipulate
hdev-&amp;gt;req_status/req_rsp concurrently, the close path may free the
response skb first, and the still-running hw_error path hits a
slab-use-after-free in kfree_skb().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Wrap the whole recovery sequence in hci_req_sync_lock/unlock so it
is serialized with every other synchronous HCI command issuer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Below is the data race report and the kasan report:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: data-race in __hci_cmd_sync_sk / btintel_shutdown_combined&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;read of hdev-&amp;gt;req_rsp at net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:199
  by task kworker/u17:1/83:
   __hci_cmd_sync_sk+0x12f2/0x1c30 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:200
   __hci_cmd_sync+0x55/0x80 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:223
   btintel_hw_error+0x114/0x670 drivers/bluetooth/btintel.c:254
   hci_error_reset+0x348/0xa30 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:1030&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;write/free by task ioctl/22580:
   btintel_shutdown_combined+0xd0/0x360
    drivers/bluetooth/btintel.c:3648
   hci_dev_close_sync+0x9ae/0x2c10 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5246
   hci_dev_do_close+0x232/0x460 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:526&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in
   sk_skb_reason_drop+0x43/0x380…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bluetooth: btintel: serialize btintel_hw_error() with hci_req_sync_lock&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;btintel_hw_error() issues two __hci_cmd_sync() calls (HCI_OP_RESET
and Intel exception-info retrieval) without holding
hci_req_sync_lock().  This lets it race against
hci_dev_do_close() -&amp;gt; btintel_shutdown_combined(), which also runs
__hci_cmd_sync() under the same lock.  When both paths manipulate
hdev-&amp;gt;req_status/req_rsp concurrently, the close path may free the
response skb first, and the still-running hw_error path hits a
slab-use-after-free in kfree_skb().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Wrap the whole recovery sequence in hci_req_sync_lock/unlock so it
is serialized with every other synchronous HCI command issuer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Below is the data race report and the kasan report:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: data-race in __hci_cmd_sync_sk / btintel_shutdown_combined&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;read of hdev-&amp;gt;req_rsp at net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:199
  by task kworker/u17:1/83:
   __hci_cmd_sync_sk+0x12f2/0x1c30 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:200
   __hci_cmd_sync+0x55/0x80 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:223
   btintel_hw_error+0x114/0x670 drivers/bluetooth/btintel.c:254
   hci_error_reset+0x348/0xa30 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:1030&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;write/free by task ioctl/22580:
   btintel_shutdown_combined+0xd0/0x360
    drivers/bluetooth/btintel.c:3648
   hci_dev_close_sync+0x9ae/0x2c10 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5246
   hci_dev_do_close+0x232/0x460 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:526&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in
   sk_skb_reason_drop+0x43/0x380…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-31500</guid>
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