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      <title>CVE-2026-32934 — CoreDNS DNS-over-QUIC unbounded goroutine growth leads to denial of service</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-32934</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; coredns&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CoreDNS is a DNS server that chains plugins. In versions prior to 1.14.3, the DNS-over-QUIC (DoQ) server can be driven into unbounded goroutine and memory growth by a remote client that opens many QUIC streams and sends only 1 byte per stream. When the worker pool is full, CoreDNS still spawns a goroutine per accepted stream to wait for a worker token. Additionally, active workers block indefinitely in io.ReadFull() with no per-stream read deadline, allowing an attacker to pin all workers by sending a single byte so the read blocks waiting for the second byte of the DoQ length prefix. This enables an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause memory exhaustion and OOM-kill. This issue has been fixed in version 1.14.3. No known workarounds exist.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; coredns&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CoreDNS is a DNS server that chains plugins. In versions prior to 1.14.3, the DNS-over-QUIC (DoQ) server can be driven into unbounded goroutine and memory growth by a remote client that opens many QUIC streams and sends only 1 byte per stream. When the worker pool is full, CoreDNS still spawns a goroutine per accepted stream to wait for a worker token. Additionally, active workers block indefinitely in io.ReadFull() with no per-stream read deadline, allowing an attacker to pin all workers by sending a single byte so the read blocks waiting for the second byte of the DoQ length prefix. This enables an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause memory exhaustion and OOM-kill. This issue has been fixed in version 1.14.3. No known workarounds exist.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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