https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 29 Sep 2026 14:44:44 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-68282 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>usb: gadget: udc: fix use-after-free in usb_gadget_state_work</p> <p>A race condition during gadget teardown can lead to a use-after-free in usb_gadget_state_work(), as reported by KASAN:</p> <p>BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in sysfs_notify+0x2c/0xd0 Workqueue: events usb_gadget_state_work</p> <p>The fundamental race occurs because a concurrent event (e.g., an interrupt) can call usb_gadget_set_state() and schedule gadget-&gt;work at any time during the cleanup process in usb_del_gadget().</p> <p>Commit 399a45e5237c (&#34;usb: gadget: core: flush gadget workqueue after device removal&#34;) attempted to fix this by moving flush_work() to after device_del(). However, this does not fully solve the race, as a new work item can still be scheduled *after* flush_work() completes but before the gadget&#39;s memory is freed, leading to the same use-after-free.</p> <p>This patch fixes the race condition robustly by introducing a &#39;teardown&#39; flag and a &#39;state_lock&#39; spinlock to the usb_gadget struct. The flag is set during cleanup in usb_del_gadget() *before* calling flush_work() to prevent any new work from being scheduled once cleanup has commenced. The scheduling site, usb_gadget_set_state(), now checks this flag under the lock before queueing the work, thus safely closing the race window.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>usb: gadget: udc: fix use-after-free in usb_gadget_state_work</p> <p>A race condition during gadget teardown can lead to a use-after-free in usb_gadget_state_work(), as reported by KASAN:</p> <p>BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in sysfs_notify+0x2c/0xd0 Workqueue: events usb_gadget_state_work</p> <p>The fundamental race occurs because a concurrent event (e.g., an interrupt) can call usb_gadget_set_state() and schedule gadget-&gt;work at any time during the cleanup process in usb_del_gadget().</p> <p>Commit 399a45e5237c (&#34;usb: gadget: core: flush gadget workqueue after device removal&#34;) attempted to fix this by moving flush_work() to after device_del(). However, this does not fully solve the race, as a new work item can still be scheduled *after* flush_work() completes but before the gadget&#39;s memory is freed, leading to the same use-after-free.</p> <p>This patch fixes the race condition robustly by introducing a &#39;teardown&#39; flag and a &#39;state_lock&#39; spinlock to the usb_gadget struct. The flag is set during cleanup in usb_del_gadget() *before* calling flush_work() to prevent any new work from being scheduled once cleanup has commenced. The scheduling site, usb_gadget_set_state(), now checks this flag under the lock before queueing the work, thus safely closing the race window.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-68282