https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 01 Oct 2026 10:16:51 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-48203 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel</p> <p>Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component (&#39;Injection&#39;), Improper Input Validation, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Apache Camel Solr component.</p> <p>The camel-solr producer copies Exchange message headers whose names begin with the SolrParam. prefix into the parameters of the Solr request, and headers whose names begin with the SolrField. prefix into the fields of the indexed Solr document. The prefix constants (SolrConstants.HEADER_PARAM_PREFIX / HEADER_FIELD_PREFIX) were the plain strings SolrParam. / SolrField.. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into a solr: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set SolrParam.* headers to inject arbitrary Solr request parameters - including shards or stream.url, which cause the Solr server to issue server-side requests to an attacker-chosen URL (server-side request forgery, for example to an internal service or a cloud metadata endpoint), or qt to reach administrative request handlers - and set SolrField.* headers to inject arbitrary fields into indexed documents. No credentials are required when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel</p> <p>Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component (&#39;Injection&#39;), Improper Input Validation, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Apache Camel Solr component.</p> <p>The camel-solr producer copies Exchange message headers whose names begin with the SolrParam. prefix into the parameters of the Solr request, and headers whose names begin with the SolrField. prefix into the fields of the indexed Solr document. The prefix constants (SolrConstants.HEADER_PARAM_PREFIX / HEADER_FIELD_PREFIX) were the plain strings SolrParam. / SolrField.. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into a solr: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set SolrParam.* headers to inject arbitrary Solr request parameters - including shards or stream.url, which cause the Solr server to issue server-side requests to an attacker-chosen URL (server-side request forgery, for example to an internal service or a cloud metadata endpoint), or qt to reach administrative request handlers - and set SolrField.* headers to inject arbitrary fields into indexed documents. No credentials are required when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-48203