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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 07:45:11 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2022-41678 — Apache ActiveMQ: Insufficient API restrictions on Jolokia allow authenticated users to perform RCE</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2022-41678</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Apache Software Foundation Apache ActiveMQ&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Once an user is authenticated on Jolokia, he can potentially trigger arbitrary code execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In details, in ActiveMQ configurations, jetty allows
org.jolokia.http.AgentServlet to handler request to /api/jolokia&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;org.jolokia.http.HttpRequestHandler#handlePostRequest is able to
create JmxRequest through JSONObject. And calls to
org.jolokia.http.HttpRequestHandler#executeRequest.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Into deeper calling stacks,
org.jolokia.handler.ExecHandler#doHandleRequest can be invoked
through refection. This could lead to RCE through via
various mbeans. One example is unrestricted deserialization in jdk.management.jfr.FlightRecorderMXBeanImpl which exists on Java version above 11.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1 Call newRecording.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2 Call setConfiguration. And a webshell data hides in it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;3 Call startRecording.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;4 Call copyTo method. The webshell will be written to a .jsp file.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The mitigation is to restrict (by default) the actions authorized on Jolokia, or disable Jolokia.
A more restrictive Jolokia configuration has been defined in default ActiveMQ distribution. We encourage users to upgrade to ActiveMQ distributions version including updated Jolokia configuration: 5.16.6, 5.17.4, 5.18.0, 6.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Apache Software Foundation Apache ActiveMQ&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Once an user is authenticated on Jolokia, he can potentially trigger arbitrary code execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In details, in ActiveMQ configurations, jetty allows
org.jolokia.http.AgentServlet to handler request to /api/jolokia&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;org.jolokia.http.HttpRequestHandler#handlePostRequest is able to
create JmxRequest through JSONObject. And calls to
org.jolokia.http.HttpRequestHandler#executeRequest.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Into deeper calling stacks,
org.jolokia.handler.ExecHandler#doHandleRequest can be invoked
through refection. This could lead to RCE through via
various mbeans. One example is unrestricted deserialization in jdk.management.jfr.FlightRecorderMXBeanImpl which exists on Java version above 11.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1 Call newRecording.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2 Call setConfiguration. And a webshell data hides in it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;3 Call startRecording.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;4 Call copyTo method. The webshell will be written to a .jsp file.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The mitigation is to restrict (by default) the actions authorized on Jolokia, or disable Jolokia.
A more restrictive Jolokia configuration has been defined in default ActiveMQ distribution. We encourage users to upgrade to ActiveMQ distributions version including updated Jolokia configuration: 5.16.6, 5.17.4, 5.18.0, 6.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2022-41678</guid>
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