<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 11:04:23 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-acronym-CVE-2026-62383 — NLTK: Symlink-based arbitrary file read in IPIPANCorpusReader, bypasses nltk.pathsec entirely</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-acronym-cve-2026-62383</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: acronym&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`IPIPANCorpusReader` (`nltk/corpus/reader/ipipan.py`) exposes public methods, `channels()`, `domains()`, `categories()`, and `fileids(channels=...)`, that accept a caller supplied `fileids` list and read a file via a completely unprotected builtin `open()` call, with no `nltk.pathsec` involvement at all. A symlink placed inside the corpus root, with a name containing no separators or `..`, passes NLTK&amp;#39;s existing traversal checks and is opened directly, reading a file from anywhere on the filesystem the process can access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All four methods route through `_get_tag()`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def _get_tag(self, f, tag):
    tags = []
    with open(f) as infile:   # builtin open(), no pathsec involvement
        header = infile.read()
    ...
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`f` arrives via `_list_header_files()` / `_list_morph_files_by()`, both of which call:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
f.replace(&amp;#34;morph.xml&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;header.xml&amp;#34;)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;on the result of `self.abspath(...)` or `self.abspaths(...)`. `FileSystemPathPointer` subclasses `str`, so `.replace()` returns a plain Python string, silently discarding the `PathPointer` wrapper. That plain string is handed straight to builtin `open()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a more severe variant of the same CWE-59 class already fixed elsewhere in this codebase (`CorpusReader.open()`, `NKJPCorpusReader.add_root()`, and the recent `FramenetCorpusReader` fix): those route file access through `nltk.pathsec.validate_path()`, at minimum the global, non-scoped check, before opening. Here, converting…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: acronym&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`IPIPANCorpusReader` (`nltk/corpus/reader/ipipan.py`) exposes public methods, `channels()`, `domains()`, `categories()`, and `fileids(channels=...)`, that accept a caller supplied `fileids` list and read a file via a completely unprotected builtin `open()` call, with no `nltk.pathsec` involvement at all. A symlink placed inside the corpus root, with a name containing no separators or `..`, passes NLTK&amp;#39;s existing traversal checks and is opened directly, reading a file from anywhere on the filesystem the process can access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All four methods route through `_get_tag()`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def _get_tag(self, f, tag):
    tags = []
    with open(f) as infile:   # builtin open(), no pathsec involvement
        header = infile.read()
    ...
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`f` arrives via `_list_header_files()` / `_list_morph_files_by()`, both of which call:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
f.replace(&amp;#34;morph.xml&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;header.xml&amp;#34;)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;on the result of `self.abspath(...)` or `self.abspaths(...)`. `FileSystemPathPointer` subclasses `str`, so `.replace()` returns a plain Python string, silently discarding the `PathPointer` wrapper. That plain string is handed straight to builtin `open()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a more severe variant of the same CWE-59 class already fixed elsewhere in this codebase (`CorpusReader.open()`, `NKJPCorpusReader.add_root()`, and the recent `FramenetCorpusReader` fix): those route file access through `nltk.pathsec.validate_path()`, at minimum the global, non-scoped check, before opening. Here, converting…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-acronym-cve-2026-62383</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-62383 — nltk IPIPANCorpusReader Symlink Arbitrary File Read</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-62383</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; nltk&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nltk versions before 3.10.2 contain a symlink-based arbitrary file read vulnerability in IPIPANCorpusReader methods that bypass nltk.pathsec validation entirely. Attackers can place a symlink in the corpus root directory and read arbitrary files accessible to the process by calling channels(), domains(), categories(), or fileids() methods with the symlink filename.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; nltk&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nltk versions before 3.10.2 contain a symlink-based arbitrary file read vulnerability in IPIPANCorpusReader methods that bypass nltk.pathsec validation entirely. Attackers can place a symlink in the corpus root directory and read arbitrary files accessible to the process by calling channels(), domains(), categories(), or fileids() methods with the symlink filename.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-62383</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3hhw-38pf-pxj6 — NLTK: Symlink-based arbitrary file read in IPIPANCorpusReader, bypasses nltk.pathsec entirely</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-3hhw-38pf-pxj6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: nltk&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`IPIPANCorpusReader` (`nltk/corpus/reader/ipipan.py`) exposes public methods, `channels()`, `domains()`, `categories()`, and `fileids(channels=...)`, that accept a caller supplied `fileids` list and read a file via a completely unprotected builtin `open()` call, with no `nltk.pathsec` involvement at all. A symlink placed inside the corpus root, with a name containing no separators or `..`, passes NLTK&amp;#39;s existing traversal checks and is opened directly, reading a file from anywhere on the filesystem the process can access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All four methods route through `_get_tag()`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def _get_tag(self, f, tag):
    tags = []
    with open(f) as infile:   # builtin open(), no pathsec involvement
        header = infile.read()
    ...
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`f` arrives via `_list_header_files()` / `_list_morph_files_by()`, both of which call:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
f.replace(&amp;#34;morph.xml&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;header.xml&amp;#34;)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;on the result of `self.abspath(...)` or `self.abspaths(...)`. `FileSystemPathPointer` subclasses `str`, so `.replace()` returns a plain Python string, silently discarding the `PathPointer` wrapper. That plain string is handed straight to builtin `open()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a more severe variant of the same CWE-59 class already fixed elsewhere in this codebase (`CorpusReader.open()`, `NKJPCorpusReader.add_root()`, and the recent `FramenetCorpusReader` fix): those route file access through `nltk.pathsec.validate_path()`, at minimum the global, non-scoped check, before opening. Here, converting…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: nltk&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`IPIPANCorpusReader` (`nltk/corpus/reader/ipipan.py`) exposes public methods, `channels()`, `domains()`, `categories()`, and `fileids(channels=...)`, that accept a caller supplied `fileids` list and read a file via a completely unprotected builtin `open()` call, with no `nltk.pathsec` involvement at all. A symlink placed inside the corpus root, with a name containing no separators or `..`, passes NLTK&amp;#39;s existing traversal checks and is opened directly, reading a file from anywhere on the filesystem the process can access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All four methods route through `_get_tag()`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def _get_tag(self, f, tag):
    tags = []
    with open(f) as infile:   # builtin open(), no pathsec involvement
        header = infile.read()
    ...
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`f` arrives via `_list_header_files()` / `_list_morph_files_by()`, both of which call:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
f.replace(&amp;#34;morph.xml&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;header.xml&amp;#34;)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;on the result of `self.abspath(...)` or `self.abspaths(...)`. `FileSystemPathPointer` subclasses `str`, so `.replace()` returns a plain Python string, silently discarding the `PathPointer` wrapper. That plain string is handed straight to builtin `open()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a more severe variant of the same CWE-59 class already fixed elsewhere in this codebase (`CorpusReader.open()`, `NKJPCorpusReader.add_root()`, and the recent `FramenetCorpusReader` fix): those route file access through `nltk.pathsec.validate_path()`, at minimum the global, non-scoped check, before opening. Here, converting…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-3hhw-38pf-pxj6</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
