https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 09 Oct 2026 20:50:04 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-ghsa-vqvg-86cc-cg83 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: openclaw-cli</p> <p>&gt; Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.</p> <p>**Title** Mutating internal `/allowlist` chat commands missed `operator.admin` scope enforcement</p> <p>**CWE** CWE-862 Missing Authorization</p> <p>**CVSS v3.1** CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N Base score: **6.5 (Medium)**</p> <p>**Severity Assessment** Medium. This is a real authorization flaw in OpenClaw’s internal control plane. The issue does not require host access, trusted local state tampering, or multi-tenant assumptions, but exploitation does require an already authenticated internal Gateway caller with `operator.write`.</p> <p>**Impact** An authenticated internal Gateway caller limited to `operator.write` can perform state-changing `/allowlist` actions without `operator.admin`, even though comparable mutating internal chat commands already require `operator.admin`. The reachable effects are persistent changes to config-backed `allowFrom` entries and pairing-store-backed allowlist entries.</p> <p>This is not a semantic-modeling complaint and not a generic “trusted operator can do things” claim. It is a missing authorization check inside OpenClaw’s own internal scope model, where peer mutating command surfaces already distinguish `operator.write` from `operator.admin`.</p> <p>**Affected Component** Verified against the latest published GitHub release tag `v2026.3.23` (`ccfeecb6887cd97937e33a71877ad512741e82b2`), published `2026-03-23T23:15:50Z`.</p> <p>Exact vulnerable path on the shipped tag: - `src/auto-reply/reply/co…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: openclaw-cli</p> <p>&gt; Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.</p> <p>**Title** Mutating internal `/allowlist` chat commands missed `operator.admin` scope enforcement</p> <p>**CWE** CWE-862 Missing Authorization</p> <p>**CVSS v3.1** CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N Base score: **6.5 (Medium)**</p> <p>**Severity Assessment** Medium. This is a real authorization flaw in OpenClaw’s internal control plane. The issue does not require host access, trusted local state tampering, or multi-tenant assumptions, but exploitation does require an already authenticated internal Gateway caller with `operator.write`.</p> <p>**Impact** An authenticated internal Gateway caller limited to `operator.write` can perform state-changing `/allowlist` actions without `operator.admin`, even though comparable mutating internal chat commands already require `operator.admin`. The reachable effects are persistent changes to config-backed `allowFrom` entries and pairing-store-backed allowlist entries.</p> <p>This is not a semantic-modeling complaint and not a generic “trusted operator can do things” claim. It is a missing authorization check inside OpenClaw’s own internal scope model, where peer mutating command surfaces already distinguish `operator.write` from `operator.admin`.</p> <p>**Affected Component** Verified against the latest published GitHub release tag `v2026.3.23` (`ccfeecb6887cd97937e33a71877ad512741e82b2`), published `2026-03-23T23:15:50Z`.</p> <p>Exact vulnerable path on the shipped tag: - `src/auto-reply/reply/co…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-ghsa-vqvg-86cc-cg83