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      <title>BREW-repomix-CVE-2026-49988 — repomix: attach_packed_output can bypass file-read secret scanning for supported local files</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-repomix-cve-2026-49988</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: repomix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# `attach_packed_output` can register arbitrary `.json/.txt/.md/.xml` files and bypass the MCP file-read safety check&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Repomix&amp;#39;s MCP server exposes a normal `file_system_read_file` tool that reads absolute paths only after running the project&amp;#39;s secret check. However, the `attach_packed_output` plus `read_repomix_output` flow can read arbitrary local `.json`, `.txt`, `.md`, or `.xml` files without the same safety check and without verifying that the file is actually a Repomix packed output.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a medium-severity local MCP file-read boundary issue. The affected deployment is the documented `repomix --mcp` stdio server used by AI assistants. A prompt or lower-trust model action that can invoke MCP tools can use `attach_packed_output` on a local JSON/text file, receive an `outputId`, then call `read_repomix_output` to retrieve the full file content.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected target&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Repository: `yamadashy/repomix`
- Commit reviewed: `adf5a12f2211a7fabf24ee11a21734adccee5143`
- Component: MCP server tools
- Package version reviewed: `repomix@1.14.0`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The file-read safety boundary is implemented per tool rather than per local-file capability. `file_system_read_file` reads the file and runs `runSecretLint()` before returning content. `attach_packed_output` reads and registers local files through a separate path, but only checks file extension and parsing format. It does not verify a Repomix output header/schema and does not run the secret check before registeri…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: repomix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# `attach_packed_output` can register arbitrary `.json/.txt/.md/.xml` files and bypass the MCP file-read safety check&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Repomix&amp;#39;s MCP server exposes a normal `file_system_read_file` tool that reads absolute paths only after running the project&amp;#39;s secret check. However, the `attach_packed_output` plus `read_repomix_output` flow can read arbitrary local `.json`, `.txt`, `.md`, or `.xml` files without the same safety check and without verifying that the file is actually a Repomix packed output.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a medium-severity local MCP file-read boundary issue. The affected deployment is the documented `repomix --mcp` stdio server used by AI assistants. A prompt or lower-trust model action that can invoke MCP tools can use `attach_packed_output` on a local JSON/text file, receive an `outputId`, then call `read_repomix_output` to retrieve the full file content.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected target&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Repository: `yamadashy/repomix`
- Commit reviewed: `adf5a12f2211a7fabf24ee11a21734adccee5143`
- Component: MCP server tools
- Package version reviewed: `repomix@1.14.0`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The file-read safety boundary is implemented per tool rather than per local-file capability. `file_system_read_file` reads the file and runs `runSecretLint()` before returning content. `attach_packed_output` reads and registers local files through a separate path, but only checks file extension and parsing format. It does not verify a Repomix output header/schema and does not run the secret check before registeri…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-repomix-cve-2026-49988</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-49988 — Repomix: attach_packed_output can bypass file-read secret scanning for supported local files</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-49988</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; yamadashy repomix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Repomix is a tool that packs repositories into AI-friendly files. Prior to 1.14.1, the Repomix MCP server attach_packed_output and read_repomix_output flow can register and read arbitrary local .json, .txt, .md, or .xml files without the file_system_read_file runSecretLint() safety check or Repomix packed-output validation, allowing MCP callers to bypass the local file-read secret-scanning boundary. This issue is fixed in version 1.14.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; yamadashy repomix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Repomix is a tool that packs repositories into AI-friendly files. Prior to 1.14.1, the Repomix MCP server attach_packed_output and read_repomix_output flow can register and read arbitrary local .json, .txt, .md, or .xml files without the file_system_read_file runSecretLint() safety check or Repomix packed-output validation, allowing MCP callers to bypass the local file-read secret-scanning boundary. This issue is fixed in version 1.14.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-49988</guid>
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