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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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      <title>BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-29608 — OpenClaw's Node system.run approval hardening wrapper semantic drift can execute unintended local scripts</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-29608</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
In `openclaw@2026.3.1`, node `system.run` approval-path hardening rewrote wrapper command argv in a way that changed execution semantics. A command shown/approved as a shell payload (for example `echo SAFE`) could execute a different local script when wrapper argv were rewritten.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Packages / Versions
- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Affected: `2026.3.1` (latest published npm version as of March 2, 2026)
- Fixed release: `2026.3.2` (released)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Technical Details
Root cause was in node-host approval hardening for `system.run`:
- `src/node-host/invoke-system-run-plan.ts` rewrote `argv[0]` to the resolved executable.
- Wrapper resolution unwrapped dispatch wrappers, so input like `[&amp;#39;env&amp;#39;,&amp;#39;sh&amp;#39;,&amp;#39;-c&amp;#39;,&amp;#39;echo SAFE&amp;#39;]` resolved executable `sh`.
- The approved plan could become `[&amp;#39;/bin/sh&amp;#39;,&amp;#39;sh&amp;#39;,&amp;#39;-c&amp;#39;,&amp;#39;echo SAFE&amp;#39;]` while approval text remained `echo SAFE`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That rewrite changed runtime behavior: `/bin/sh` interprets the extra `sh` positional argument as a script path, enabling execution of a local `./sh` file from approved `cwd` instead of the approved payload text.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
Approval-integrity break in `host=node` execution flow: operator-visible command text and executed behavior could diverge.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploit preconditions:
- attacker can influence wrapper argv and place a local file in approved working directory,
- operator grants approval for the displayed command.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix Commit(s)
- `dded569626b0d8e7bdab10b5e7528b6caf73a0f1`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fixed Version
- Patched in `open…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
In `openclaw@2026.3.1`, node `system.run` approval-path hardening rewrote wrapper command argv in a way that changed execution semantics. A command shown/approved as a shell payload (for example `echo SAFE`) could execute a different local script when wrapper argv were rewritten.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Packages / Versions
- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Affected: `2026.3.1` (latest published npm version as of March 2, 2026)
- Fixed release: `2026.3.2` (released)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Technical Details
Root cause was in node-host approval hardening for `system.run`:
- `src/node-host/invoke-system-run-plan.ts` rewrote `argv[0]` to the resolved executable.
- Wrapper resolution unwrapped dispatch wrappers, so input like `[&amp;#39;env&amp;#39;,&amp;#39;sh&amp;#39;,&amp;#39;-c&amp;#39;,&amp;#39;echo SAFE&amp;#39;]` resolved executable `sh`.
- The approved plan could become `[&amp;#39;/bin/sh&amp;#39;,&amp;#39;sh&amp;#39;,&amp;#39;-c&amp;#39;,&amp;#39;echo SAFE&amp;#39;]` while approval text remained `echo SAFE`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That rewrite changed runtime behavior: `/bin/sh` interprets the extra `sh` positional argument as a script path, enabling execution of a local `./sh` file from approved `cwd` instead of the approved payload text.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
Approval-integrity break in `host=node` execution flow: operator-visible command text and executed behavior could diverge.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploit preconditions:
- attacker can influence wrapper argv and place a local file in approved working directory,
- operator grants approval for the displayed command.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix Commit(s)
- `dded569626b0d8e7bdab10b5e7528b6caf73a0f1`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fixed Version
- Patched in `open…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-29608</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-29608 — OpenClaw 2026.3.1 &lt; 2026.3.2 - Approval Integrity Bypass via system.run argv Rewriting</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-29608</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; OpenClaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw 2026.3.1 contains an approval integrity vulnerability in system.run node-host execution where argv rewriting changes command semantics. Attackers can place malicious local scripts in the working directory to execute unintended code despite operator approval of different command text.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; OpenClaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw 2026.3.1 contains an approval integrity vulnerability in system.run node-host execution where argv rewriting changes command semantics. Attackers can place malicious local scripts in the working directory to execute unintended code despite operator approval of different command text.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-29608</guid>
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