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    <item>
      <title>BREW-nx-CVE-2026-54753 — `nx graph` dev server permissive CORS policy</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-nx-cve-2026-54753</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: nx&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The local HTTP server started by `nx graph` sent `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on every response, letting any website a developer visited read the server&amp;#39;s responses cross-origin — including the full project graph and the output of the `/help` endpoint, which runs a target&amp;#39;s configured help command. The practical impact is typically **cross-origin information disclosure**, but can be arbitrary command injection in rare cases.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Severity&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitation requires the developer to be running `nx graph` and to visit an attacker page. Any execution beyond benign help commands also requires a malicious target to already be present in the workspace (see Details).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected &amp;amp; Patched Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Package: `nx` (npm).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Affected:** `&amp;gt;= 17.0.4, &amp;lt; 22.7.2` and `&amp;gt;= 23.0.0-beta.0, &amp;lt; 23.0.0-beta.2`
- **Patched:** `22.7.2`+ (backport) and `23.0.0` (first in `23.0.0-beta.2`)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The wildcard CORS header was introduced in `17.0.4`; the `/help` execution endpoint in `19.4.0`. **The `21.x` line is not patched** — `21.x` users should upgrade to `22.7.2` or later.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`nx graph` starts a local server (default `http://127.0.0.1:4211`). Before the fix, its request handler set a wildcard CORS header on every response:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
res.setHeader(&amp;#39;Access-Control-Allow-Origin&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;*&amp;#39;);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `/help` endpoint runs a target&amp;#39;s configured command:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
const command = target.metadata?.help?.command;
return execSync(command, { cwd: target.options?.cwd ?? workspaceRoot }).toString();
``…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: nx&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The local HTTP server started by `nx graph` sent `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on every response, letting any website a developer visited read the server&amp;#39;s responses cross-origin — including the full project graph and the output of the `/help` endpoint, which runs a target&amp;#39;s configured help command. The practical impact is typically **cross-origin information disclosure**, but can be arbitrary command injection in rare cases.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Severity&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitation requires the developer to be running `nx graph` and to visit an attacker page. Any execution beyond benign help commands also requires a malicious target to already be present in the workspace (see Details).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected &amp;amp; Patched Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Package: `nx` (npm).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Affected:** `&amp;gt;= 17.0.4, &amp;lt; 22.7.2` and `&amp;gt;= 23.0.0-beta.0, &amp;lt; 23.0.0-beta.2`
- **Patched:** `22.7.2`+ (backport) and `23.0.0` (first in `23.0.0-beta.2`)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The wildcard CORS header was introduced in `17.0.4`; the `/help` execution endpoint in `19.4.0`. **The `21.x` line is not patched** — `21.x` users should upgrade to `22.7.2` or later.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`nx graph` starts a local server (default `http://127.0.0.1:4211`). Before the fix, its request handler set a wildcard CORS header on every response:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
res.setHeader(&amp;#39;Access-Control-Allow-Origin&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;*&amp;#39;);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `/help` endpoint runs a target&amp;#39;s configured command:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
const command = target.metadata?.help?.command;
return execSync(command, { cwd: target.options?.cwd ?? workspaceRoot }).toString();
``…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-nx-cve-2026-54753</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-54753 — Nx: `nx graph` dev server permissive CORS policy</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-54753</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; nrwl nx&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nx is a monorepo solution for TypeScript and polyglot codebases. From 17.0.4 until 22.7.2 and 23.0.0-beta.2, the local HTTP server started by nx graph sent Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * on every response, letting any website a developer visited read the server&amp;#39;s responses cross-origin — including the full project graph and the output of the /help endpoint, which runs a target&amp;#39;s configured help command. The practical impact is typically cross-origin information disclosure, but can be arbitrary command injection in rare cases. This vulnerability is fixed in 22.7.2 and 23.0.0-beta.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; nrwl nx&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nx is a monorepo solution for TypeScript and polyglot codebases. From 17.0.4 until 22.7.2 and 23.0.0-beta.2, the local HTTP server started by nx graph sent Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * on every response, letting any website a developer visited read the server&amp;#39;s responses cross-origin — including the full project graph and the output of the /help endpoint, which runs a target&amp;#39;s configured help command. The practical impact is typically cross-origin information disclosure, but can be arbitrary command injection in rare cases. This vulnerability is fixed in 22.7.2 and 23.0.0-beta.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-54753</guid>
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