https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 10 Oct 2026 11:47:08 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-ghsa-56f2-hvwg-5743 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: openclaw-cli</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the Image tool allowed attackers to force OpenClaw to make HTTP requests to arbitrary internal or restricted network targets.</p> <p>## Affected Versions</p> <p>- npm: openclaw &lt;= 2026.2.1</p> <p>## Patched Versions</p> <p>- npm: openclaw 2026.2.2 and later</p> <p>## Fix Commits</p> <p>- 81c68f582d4a9a20d9cca9f367d2da9edc5a65ae (guard remote media fetches with SSRF checks) - 9bd64c8a1f91dda602afc1d5246a2ff2be164647 (expand SSRF guard coverage)</p> <p>## Details</p> <p>The Image tool accepts file paths, file:// URLs, data: URLs, and http(s) URLs. In vulnerable versions, http(s) URLs were fetched without SSRF protections, enabling requests to localhost, RFC1918, link-local, and cloud metadata targets.</p> <p>This was fixed by routing remote media fetching through the SSRF guard (private/internal IP + hostname blocking, redirect hardening, DNS pinning).</p> <p>## Exploitability Notes</p> <p>- Requires attacker-controlled invocation of the Image tool (direct tool access, or a gateway/channel surface that forwards untrusted `image` arguments into tool calls). - The image tool expects the fetched content to be an image. Many high-value SSRF targets return text/JSON (for example cloud metadata endpoints), which will typically fail media-type validation. In practice, the most direct confidentiality impact comes from internal endpoints that actually return images (screenshots/renderers, camera snapshots, chart exports, etc.). - Remote fetches are GET-only with no custom headers. Some…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: openclaw-cli</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the Image tool allowed attackers to force OpenClaw to make HTTP requests to arbitrary internal or restricted network targets.</p> <p>## Affected Versions</p> <p>- npm: openclaw &lt;= 2026.2.1</p> <p>## Patched Versions</p> <p>- npm: openclaw 2026.2.2 and later</p> <p>## Fix Commits</p> <p>- 81c68f582d4a9a20d9cca9f367d2da9edc5a65ae (guard remote media fetches with SSRF checks) - 9bd64c8a1f91dda602afc1d5246a2ff2be164647 (expand SSRF guard coverage)</p> <p>## Details</p> <p>The Image tool accepts file paths, file:// URLs, data: URLs, and http(s) URLs. In vulnerable versions, http(s) URLs were fetched without SSRF protections, enabling requests to localhost, RFC1918, link-local, and cloud metadata targets.</p> <p>This was fixed by routing remote media fetching through the SSRF guard (private/internal IP + hostname blocking, redirect hardening, DNS pinning).</p> <p>## Exploitability Notes</p> <p>- Requires attacker-controlled invocation of the Image tool (direct tool access, or a gateway/channel surface that forwards untrusted `image` arguments into tool calls). - The image tool expects the fetched content to be an image. Many high-value SSRF targets return text/JSON (for example cloud metadata endpoints), which will typically fail media-type validation. In practice, the most direct confidentiality impact comes from internal endpoints that actually return images (screenshots/renderers, camera snapshots, chart exports, etc.). - Remote fetches are GET-only with no custom headers. Some…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-ghsa-56f2-hvwg-5743