<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 18:21:02 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-98158</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98158</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ppp_async: drop the errored frame instead of resetting its headroom&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ppp_receive_nonmp_frame() prepends a two-byte direction tag before running
the pass/active BPF filters:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*(__be16 *)skb_push(skb, 2) = htons(PPP_FILTER_INBOUND_TAG);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nothing on the receive path guarantees those two bytes of headroom. The
frame-error path in ppp_async&amp;#39;s process_input_packet() resets a reused skb&amp;#39;s
headroom to zero while claiming to restore it to a freshly allocated state -
but a fresh skb from dev_alloc_skb() carries NET_SKB_PAD:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;err:
		if (skb) {
			/* make skb appear as freshly allocated */
			skb_trim(skb, 0);
			skb_reserve(skb, - skb_headroom(skb));
		}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ap-&amp;gt;rpkt still points at that skb, so the next frame is reassembled into it
with no headroom at all. A peer that sends a bad-FCS frame followed by one
beginning ff 03 then leaves a single byte of headroom by the time the filter
tag is pushed, which lands one byte below skb-&amp;gt;head:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;skbuff: skb_under_panic: len:49 put:2 head:ffff888003c10000
          data:ffff888003c0ffff tail:0x30 end:0x640 dev:&amp;lt;NULL&amp;gt;
  kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214!
  RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x13e/0x230
  Call Trace:
   skb_push+0xbd/0x100
   ppp_receive_nonmp_frame+0x48a/0x1d10
   ppp_input+0x4e9/0x2f80
   ppp_async_process+0x2a/0xe0
   tasklet_action_common+0x20f/0x8a0
   handle_softirqs+0x18e/0x590
  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Zeroing the headroom violates the…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ppp_async: drop the errored frame instead of resetting its headroom&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ppp_receive_nonmp_frame() prepends a two-byte direction tag before running
the pass/active BPF filters:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*(__be16 *)skb_push(skb, 2) = htons(PPP_FILTER_INBOUND_TAG);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nothing on the receive path guarantees those two bytes of headroom. The
frame-error path in ppp_async&amp;#39;s process_input_packet() resets a reused skb&amp;#39;s
headroom to zero while claiming to restore it to a freshly allocated state -
but a fresh skb from dev_alloc_skb() carries NET_SKB_PAD:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;err:
		if (skb) {
			/* make skb appear as freshly allocated */
			skb_trim(skb, 0);
			skb_reserve(skb, - skb_headroom(skb));
		}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ap-&amp;gt;rpkt still points at that skb, so the next frame is reassembled into it
with no headroom at all. A peer that sends a bad-FCS frame followed by one
beginning ff 03 then leaves a single byte of headroom by the time the filter
tag is pushed, which lands one byte below skb-&amp;gt;head:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;skbuff: skb_under_panic: len:49 put:2 head:ffff888003c10000
          data:ffff888003c0ffff tail:0x30 end:0x640 dev:&amp;lt;NULL&amp;gt;
  kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214!
  RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x13e/0x230
  Call Trace:
   skb_push+0xbd/0x100
   ppp_receive_nonmp_frame+0x48a/0x1d10
   ppp_input+0x4e9/0x2f80
   ppp_async_process+0x2a/0xe0
   tasklet_action_common+0x20f/0x8a0
   handle_softirqs+0x18e/0x590
  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Zeroing the headroom violates the…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98158</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-qfj9-3jj2-w6g8</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-qfj9-3jj2-w6g8</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ppp_async: drop the errored frame instead of resetting its headroom&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ppp_receive_nonmp_frame() prepends a two-byte direction tag before running
the pass/active BPF filters:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*(__be16 *)skb_push(skb, 2) = htons(PPP_FILTER_INBOUND_TAG);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nothing on the receive path guarantees those two bytes of headroom. The
frame-error path in ppp_async&amp;#39;s process_input_packet() resets a reused skb&amp;#39;s
headroom to zero while claiming to restore it to a freshly allocated state -
but a fresh skb from dev_alloc_skb() carries NET_SKB_PAD:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;err:
		if (skb) {
			/* make skb appear as freshly allocated */
			skb_trim(skb, 0);
			skb_reserve(skb, - skb_headroom(skb));
		}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ap-&amp;gt;rpkt still points at that skb, so the next frame is reassembled into it
with no headroom at all. A peer that sends a bad-FCS frame followed by one
beginning ff 03 then leaves a single byte of headroom by the time the filter
tag is pushed, which lands one byte below skb-&amp;gt;head:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;skbuff: skb_under_panic: len:49 put:2 head:ffff888003c10000
          data:ffff888003c0ffff tail:0x30 end:0x640 dev:&amp;lt;NULL&amp;gt;
  kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214!
  RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x13e/0x230
  Call Trace:
   skb_push+0xbd/0x100
   ppp_receive_nonmp_frame+0x48a/0x1d10
   ppp_input+0x4e9/0x2f80
   ppp_async_process+0x2a/0xe0
   tasklet_action_common+0x20f/0x8a0
   handle_softirqs+0x18e/0x590
  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Zeroing the headroom violates the…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ppp_async: drop the errored frame instead of resetting its headroom&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ppp_receive_nonmp_frame() prepends a two-byte direction tag before running
the pass/active BPF filters:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*(__be16 *)skb_push(skb, 2) = htons(PPP_FILTER_INBOUND_TAG);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nothing on the receive path guarantees those two bytes of headroom. The
frame-error path in ppp_async&amp;#39;s process_input_packet() resets a reused skb&amp;#39;s
headroom to zero while claiming to restore it to a freshly allocated state -
but a fresh skb from dev_alloc_skb() carries NET_SKB_PAD:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;err:
		if (skb) {
			/* make skb appear as freshly allocated */
			skb_trim(skb, 0);
			skb_reserve(skb, - skb_headroom(skb));
		}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ap-&amp;gt;rpkt still points at that skb, so the next frame is reassembled into it
with no headroom at all. A peer that sends a bad-FCS frame followed by one
beginning ff 03 then leaves a single byte of headroom by the time the filter
tag is pushed, which lands one byte below skb-&amp;gt;head:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;skbuff: skb_under_panic: len:49 put:2 head:ffff888003c10000
          data:ffff888003c0ffff tail:0x30 end:0x640 dev:&amp;lt;NULL&amp;gt;
  kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214!
  RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x13e/0x230
  Call Trace:
   skb_push+0xbd/0x100
   ppp_receive_nonmp_frame+0x48a/0x1d10
   ppp_input+0x4e9/0x2f80
   ppp_async_process+0x2a/0xe0
   tasklet_action_common+0x20f/0x8a0
   handle_softirqs+0x18e/0x590
  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Zeroing the headroom violates the…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-qfj9-3jj2-w6g8</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-98158</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98158</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ppp_async: drop the errored frame instead of resetting its headroom ppp_receive_nonmp_frame() prepends a two-byte direction tag before running the pass/active BPF filters: 	*(__be16 *)skb_push(skb, 2) = htons(PPP_FILTER_INBOUND_TAG); Nothing on the receive path guarantees those two bytes of headroom. The frame-error path in ppp_async&amp;#39;s process_input_packet() resets a reused skb&amp;#39;s headroom to zero while claiming to restore it to a freshly allocated state - but a fresh skb from dev_alloc_skb() carries NET_SKB_PAD: 	err: 		if (skb) { 			/* make skb appear as freshly allocated */ 			skb_trim(skb, 0); 			skb_reserve(skb, - skb_headroom(skb)); 		} ap-&amp;gt;rpkt still points at that skb, so the next frame is reassembled into it with no headroom at all. A peer that sends a bad-FCS frame followed by one beginning ff 03 then leaves a single byte of headroom by the time the filter tag is pushed, which lands one byte below skb-&amp;gt;head:   skbuff: skb_under_panic: len:49 put:2 head:ffff888003c10000           data:ffff888003c0ffff tail:0x30 end:0x640 dev:&amp;lt;NULL&amp;gt;   kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214!   RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x13e/0x230   Call Trace:    skb_push+0xbd/0x100    ppp_receive_nonmp_frame+0x48a/0x1d10    ppp_input+0x4e9/0x2f80    ppp_async_process+0x2a/0xe0    tasklet_action_common+0x20f/0x8a0    handle_softirqs+0x18e/0x590   Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Zeroing the headroom violates the NET_SKB…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ppp_async: drop the errored frame instead of resetting its headroom ppp_receive_nonmp_frame() prepends a two-byte direction tag before running the pass/active BPF filters: 	*(__be16 *)skb_push(skb, 2) = htons(PPP_FILTER_INBOUND_TAG); Nothing on the receive path guarantees those two bytes of headroom. The frame-error path in ppp_async&amp;#39;s process_input_packet() resets a reused skb&amp;#39;s headroom to zero while claiming to restore it to a freshly allocated state - but a fresh skb from dev_alloc_skb() carries NET_SKB_PAD: 	err: 		if (skb) { 			/* make skb appear as freshly allocated */ 			skb_trim(skb, 0); 			skb_reserve(skb, - skb_headroom(skb)); 		} ap-&amp;gt;rpkt still points at that skb, so the next frame is reassembled into it with no headroom at all. A peer that sends a bad-FCS frame followed by one beginning ff 03 then leaves a single byte of headroom by the time the filter tag is pushed, which lands one byte below skb-&amp;gt;head:   skbuff: skb_under_panic: len:49 put:2 head:ffff888003c10000           data:ffff888003c0ffff tail:0x30 end:0x640 dev:&amp;lt;NULL&amp;gt;   kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214!   RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x13e/0x230   Call Trace:    skb_push+0xbd/0x100    ppp_receive_nonmp_frame+0x48a/0x1d10    ppp_input+0x4e9/0x2f80    ppp_async_process+0x2a/0xe0    tasklet_action_common+0x20f/0x8a0    handle_softirqs+0x18e/0x590   Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Zeroing the headroom violates the NET_SKB…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98158</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3579 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3579</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen oder nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen oder nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3579</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
