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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 20:20:43 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-98096</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98096</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ipv6: sr: restore network header before routing and forwarding&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ipv6_srh_rcv() runs with skb-&amp;gt;data at the Segment Routing Header (SRH)
while skb_network_header() points at the IPv6 header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When segments_left &amp;gt; 0, ipv6_srh_rcv() previously restored the skb-&amp;gt;data
position by pushing sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), assuming the SRH immediately
followed the fixed IPv6 header. If another extension header (such as a
Hop-by-Hop options header) precedes the SRH, skb_network_offset()
remained negative.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This led to two problems:
1. During ip6_route_input(), fib6_rules_early_flow_dissect() invokes
   __skb_flow_dissect() which passes the negative skb_network_offset()
   to flow dissection, breaking BPF and C flow dissector logic.
2. If forwarded via ip6_forward() or redirected via act_mirred, downstream
   handlers (like sch_fragment() or neighbour output) pass the negative
   offset as an unsigned length, triggering OOB memcpy or buffer overflows.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by pushing -skb_network_offset(skb) before routing, ensuring
skb_network_offset(skb) is 0 for route lookup / flow dissection as well as
downstream forwarding. On the loopback path, pull skb_transport_offset(skb)
to restore skb-&amp;gt;data to the SRH before looping back.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ipv6: sr: restore network header before routing and forwarding&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ipv6_srh_rcv() runs with skb-&amp;gt;data at the Segment Routing Header (SRH)
while skb_network_header() points at the IPv6 header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When segments_left &amp;gt; 0, ipv6_srh_rcv() previously restored the skb-&amp;gt;data
position by pushing sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), assuming the SRH immediately
followed the fixed IPv6 header. If another extension header (such as a
Hop-by-Hop options header) precedes the SRH, skb_network_offset()
remained negative.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This led to two problems:
1. During ip6_route_input(), fib6_rules_early_flow_dissect() invokes
   __skb_flow_dissect() which passes the negative skb_network_offset()
   to flow dissection, breaking BPF and C flow dissector logic.
2. If forwarded via ip6_forward() or redirected via act_mirred, downstream
   handlers (like sch_fragment() or neighbour output) pass the negative
   offset as an unsigned length, triggering OOB memcpy or buffer overflows.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by pushing -skb_network_offset(skb) before routing, ensuring
skb_network_offset(skb) is 0 for route lookup / flow dissection as well as
downstream forwarding. On the loopback path, pull skb_transport_offset(skb)
to restore skb-&amp;gt;data to the SRH before looping back.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98096</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-qgrh-x7hc-r5h3</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-qgrh-x7hc-r5h3</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ipv6: sr: restore network header before routing and forwarding&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ipv6_srh_rcv() runs with skb-&amp;gt;data at the Segment Routing Header (SRH)
while skb_network_header() points at the IPv6 header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When segments_left &amp;gt; 0, ipv6_srh_rcv() previously restored the skb-&amp;gt;data
position by pushing sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), assuming the SRH immediately
followed the fixed IPv6 header. If another extension header (such as a
Hop-by-Hop options header) precedes the SRH, skb_network_offset()
remained negative.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This led to two problems:
1. During ip6_route_input(), fib6_rules_early_flow_dissect() invokes
   __skb_flow_dissect() which passes the negative skb_network_offset()
   to flow dissection, breaking BPF and C flow dissector logic.
2. If forwarded via ip6_forward() or redirected via act_mirred, downstream
   handlers (like sch_fragment() or neighbour output) pass the negative
   offset as an unsigned length, triggering OOB memcpy or buffer overflows.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by pushing -skb_network_offset(skb) before routing, ensuring
skb_network_offset(skb) is 0 for route lookup / flow dissection as well as
downstream forwarding. On the loopback path, pull skb_transport_offset(skb)
to restore skb-&amp;gt;data to the SRH before looping back.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ipv6: sr: restore network header before routing and forwarding&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ipv6_srh_rcv() runs with skb-&amp;gt;data at the Segment Routing Header (SRH)
while skb_network_header() points at the IPv6 header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When segments_left &amp;gt; 0, ipv6_srh_rcv() previously restored the skb-&amp;gt;data
position by pushing sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), assuming the SRH immediately
followed the fixed IPv6 header. If another extension header (such as a
Hop-by-Hop options header) precedes the SRH, skb_network_offset()
remained negative.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This led to two problems:
1. During ip6_route_input(), fib6_rules_early_flow_dissect() invokes
   __skb_flow_dissect() which passes the negative skb_network_offset()
   to flow dissection, breaking BPF and C flow dissector logic.
2. If forwarded via ip6_forward() or redirected via act_mirred, downstream
   handlers (like sch_fragment() or neighbour output) pass the negative
   offset as an unsigned length, triggering OOB memcpy or buffer overflows.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by pushing -skb_network_offset(skb) before routing, ensuring
skb_network_offset(skb) is 0 for route lookup / flow dissection as well as
downstream forwarding. On the loopback path, pull skb_transport_offset(skb)
to restore skb-&amp;gt;data to the SRH before looping back.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-qgrh-x7hc-r5h3</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-98096</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98096</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: sr: restore network header before routing and forwarding ipv6_srh_rcv() runs with skb-&amp;gt;data at the Segment Routing Header (SRH) while skb_network_header() points at the IPv6 header. When segments_left &amp;gt; 0, ipv6_srh_rcv() previously restored the skb-&amp;gt;data position by pushing sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), assuming the SRH immediately followed the fixed IPv6 header. If another extension header (such as a Hop-by-Hop options header) precedes the SRH, skb_network_offset() remained negative. This led to two problems: 1. During ip6_route_input(), fib6_rules_early_flow_dissect() invokes    __skb_flow_dissect() which passes the negative skb_network_offset()    to flow dissection, breaking BPF and C flow dissector logic. 2. If forwarded via ip6_forward() or redirected via act_mirred, downstream    handlers (like sch_fragment() or neighbour output) pass the negative    offset as an unsigned length, triggering OOB memcpy or buffer overflows. Fix this by pushing -skb_network_offset(skb) before routing, ensuring skb_network_offset(skb) is 0 for route lookup / flow dissection as well as downstream forwarding. On the loopback path, pull skb_transport_offset(skb) to restore skb-&amp;gt;data to the SRH before looping back.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: sr: restore network header before routing and forwarding ipv6_srh_rcv() runs with skb-&amp;gt;data at the Segment Routing Header (SRH) while skb_network_header() points at the IPv6 header. When segments_left &amp;gt; 0, ipv6_srh_rcv() previously restored the skb-&amp;gt;data position by pushing sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), assuming the SRH immediately followed the fixed IPv6 header. If another extension header (such as a Hop-by-Hop options header) precedes the SRH, skb_network_offset() remained negative. This led to two problems: 1. During ip6_route_input(), fib6_rules_early_flow_dissect() invokes    __skb_flow_dissect() which passes the negative skb_network_offset()    to flow dissection, breaking BPF and C flow dissector logic. 2. If forwarded via ip6_forward() or redirected via act_mirred, downstream    handlers (like sch_fragment() or neighbour output) pass the negative    offset as an unsigned length, triggering OOB memcpy or buffer overflows. Fix this by pushing -skb_network_offset(skb) before routing, ensuring skb_network_offset(skb) is 0 for route lookup / flow dissection as well as downstream forwarding. On the loopback path, pull skb_transport_offset(skb) to restore skb-&amp;gt;data to the SRH before looping back.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98096</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3579 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3579</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen oder nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen oder nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3579</guid>
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