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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 02:10:57 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-98075</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98075</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC reference to the main program&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fixups.c:jit_subprogs() rewrites BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads to contain real
function addresses. This function is invoked from bpf_jit_subprogs()
only when env-&amp;gt;subprog_cnt &amp;gt; 1. Meaning that for any program like
below:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;int main(void *ctx) {
    void *ptr = main;
    ...
    bpf_timer_set_callback(..., ptr);
    ...
  }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The &amp;#39;ptr&amp;#39; won&amp;#39;t be ever converted to contain an address.
In combination with e.g. bpf_timer_set_callback() this would lead to a
function call at a bogus address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Instead of complicating the implementation, just assume that no useful
program needs main to be a sync or async callback and reject
BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads for the main subprogram.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC reference to the main program&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fixups.c:jit_subprogs() rewrites BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads to contain real
function addresses. This function is invoked from bpf_jit_subprogs()
only when env-&amp;gt;subprog_cnt &amp;gt; 1. Meaning that for any program like
below:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;int main(void *ctx) {
    void *ptr = main;
    ...
    bpf_timer_set_callback(..., ptr);
    ...
  }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The &amp;#39;ptr&amp;#39; won&amp;#39;t be ever converted to contain an address.
In combination with e.g. bpf_timer_set_callback() this would lead to a
function call at a bogus address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Instead of complicating the implementation, just assume that no useful
program needs main to be a sync or async callback and reject
BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads for the main subprogram.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98075</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-fx7f-ghjh-g2gw</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-fx7f-ghjh-g2gw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC reference to the main program&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fixups.c:jit_subprogs() rewrites BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads to contain real
function addresses. This function is invoked from bpf_jit_subprogs()
only when env-&amp;gt;subprog_cnt &amp;gt; 1. Meaning that for any program like
below:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;int main(void *ctx) {
    void *ptr = main;
    ...
    bpf_timer_set_callback(..., ptr);
    ...
  }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The &amp;#39;ptr&amp;#39; won&amp;#39;t be ever converted to contain an address.
In combination with e.g. bpf_timer_set_callback() this would lead to a
function call at a bogus address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Instead of complicating the implementation, just assume that no useful
program needs main to be a sync or async callback and reject
BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads for the main subprogram.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC reference to the main program&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fixups.c:jit_subprogs() rewrites BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads to contain real
function addresses. This function is invoked from bpf_jit_subprogs()
only when env-&amp;gt;subprog_cnt &amp;gt; 1. Meaning that for any program like
below:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;int main(void *ctx) {
    void *ptr = main;
    ...
    bpf_timer_set_callback(..., ptr);
    ...
  }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The &amp;#39;ptr&amp;#39; won&amp;#39;t be ever converted to contain an address.
In combination with e.g. bpf_timer_set_callback() this would lead to a
function call at a bogus address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Instead of complicating the implementation, just assume that no useful
program needs main to be a sync or async callback and reject
BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads for the main subprogram.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-fx7f-ghjh-g2gw</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-98075</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98075</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC reference to the main program fixups.c:jit_subprogs() rewrites BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads to contain real function addresses. This function is invoked from bpf_jit_subprogs() only when env-&amp;gt;subprog_cnt &amp;gt; 1. Meaning that for any program like below:   int main(void *ctx) {     void *ptr = main;     ...     bpf_timer_set_callback(..., ptr);     ...   } The &amp;#39;ptr&amp;#39; won&amp;#39;t be ever converted to contain an address. In combination with e.g. bpf_timer_set_callback() this would lead to a function call at a bogus address. Instead of complicating the implementation, just assume that no useful program needs main to be a sync or async callback and reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads for the main subprogram.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC reference to the main program fixups.c:jit_subprogs() rewrites BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads to contain real function addresses. This function is invoked from bpf_jit_subprogs() only when env-&amp;gt;subprog_cnt &amp;gt; 1. Meaning that for any program like below:   int main(void *ctx) {     void *ptr = main;     ...     bpf_timer_set_callback(..., ptr);     ...   } The &amp;#39;ptr&amp;#39; won&amp;#39;t be ever converted to contain an address. In combination with e.g. bpf_timer_set_callback() this would lead to a function call at a bogus address. Instead of complicating the implementation, just assume that no useful program needs main to be a sync or async callback and reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads for the main subprogram.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98075</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3579 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3579</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen oder nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen oder nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3579</guid>
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