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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 18:55:04 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-98068</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98068</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/rds: don&amp;#39;t let rds_conn_shutdown() consume a concurrent drop&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rds_conn_shutdown() finishes by moving the path from
RDS_CONN_DISCONNECTING to RDS_CONN_DOWN, and also accepts
RDS_CONN_ERROR as the starting state of that final transition, so that
a FIN processed in softirq context during the teardown does not derail
the shutdown into a noisy error path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But consuming that RDS_CONN_ERROR also consumes the shutdown pass that
came with it: rds_conn_path_drop() sets RDS_CONN_ERROR and then queues
cp_down_w, and a pass that starts on a path already in RDS_CONN_DOWN
is a no-op.  For the FIN case that is harmless - the socket the FIN
arrived on is the very socket the teardown just released.  It is not
harmless for a dropper that attached something to the path first.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rds_tcp_accept_one() is such a dropper.  Its path claim in
rds_tcp_accept_one_path() transitions RDS_CONN_DOWN -&amp;gt;
RDS_CONN_CONNECTING, and a concurrent drop - a FIN on a previous
socket in softirq context, an administrative reset - can put the path
into RDS_CONN_ERROR between that claim and the state check that
follows, which accepts RDS_CONN_ERROR.  The accept then installs the
freshly accepted socket with rds_tcp_set_callbacks() while the queued
teardown - which sampled tc-&amp;gt;t_sock before this socket existed - is
still running.  rds_connect_path_complete() fails its transition to
RDS_CONN_UP and drops the path again, queueing the pass that should
r…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/rds: don&amp;#39;t let rds_conn_shutdown() consume a concurrent drop&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rds_conn_shutdown() finishes by moving the path from
RDS_CONN_DISCONNECTING to RDS_CONN_DOWN, and also accepts
RDS_CONN_ERROR as the starting state of that final transition, so that
a FIN processed in softirq context during the teardown does not derail
the shutdown into a noisy error path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But consuming that RDS_CONN_ERROR also consumes the shutdown pass that
came with it: rds_conn_path_drop() sets RDS_CONN_ERROR and then queues
cp_down_w, and a pass that starts on a path already in RDS_CONN_DOWN
is a no-op.  For the FIN case that is harmless - the socket the FIN
arrived on is the very socket the teardown just released.  It is not
harmless for a dropper that attached something to the path first.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rds_tcp_accept_one() is such a dropper.  Its path claim in
rds_tcp_accept_one_path() transitions RDS_CONN_DOWN -&amp;gt;
RDS_CONN_CONNECTING, and a concurrent drop - a FIN on a previous
socket in softirq context, an administrative reset - can put the path
into RDS_CONN_ERROR between that claim and the state check that
follows, which accepts RDS_CONN_ERROR.  The accept then installs the
freshly accepted socket with rds_tcp_set_callbacks() while the queued
teardown - which sampled tc-&amp;gt;t_sock before this socket existed - is
still running.  rds_connect_path_complete() fails its transition to
RDS_CONN_UP and drops the path again, queueing the pass that should
r…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98068</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-v6pw-c666-7jqh</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-v6pw-c666-7jqh</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/rds: don&amp;#39;t let rds_conn_shutdown() consume a concurrent drop&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rds_conn_shutdown() finishes by moving the path from
RDS_CONN_DISCONNECTING to RDS_CONN_DOWN, and also accepts
RDS_CONN_ERROR as the starting state of that final transition, so that
a FIN processed in softirq context during the teardown does not derail
the shutdown into a noisy error path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But consuming that RDS_CONN_ERROR also consumes the shutdown pass that
came with it: rds_conn_path_drop() sets RDS_CONN_ERROR and then queues
cp_down_w, and a pass that starts on a path already in RDS_CONN_DOWN
is a no-op.  For the FIN case that is harmless - the socket the FIN
arrived on is the very socket the teardown just released.  It is not
harmless for a dropper that attached something to the path first.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rds_tcp_accept_one() is such a dropper.  Its path claim in
rds_tcp_accept_one_path() transitions RDS_CONN_DOWN -&amp;gt;
RDS_CONN_CONNECTING, and a concurrent drop - a FIN on a previous
socket in softirq context, an administrative reset - can put the path
into RDS_CONN_ERROR between that claim and the state check that
follows, which accepts RDS_CONN_ERROR.  The accept then installs the
freshly accepted socket with rds_tcp_set_callbacks() while the queued
teardown - which sampled tc-&amp;gt;t_sock before this socket existed - is
still running.  rds_connect_path_complete() fails its transition to
RDS_CONN_UP and drops the path again, queueing the pass that should
r…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/rds: don&amp;#39;t let rds_conn_shutdown() consume a concurrent drop&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rds_conn_shutdown() finishes by moving the path from
RDS_CONN_DISCONNECTING to RDS_CONN_DOWN, and also accepts
RDS_CONN_ERROR as the starting state of that final transition, so that
a FIN processed in softirq context during the teardown does not derail
the shutdown into a noisy error path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But consuming that RDS_CONN_ERROR also consumes the shutdown pass that
came with it: rds_conn_path_drop() sets RDS_CONN_ERROR and then queues
cp_down_w, and a pass that starts on a path already in RDS_CONN_DOWN
is a no-op.  For the FIN case that is harmless - the socket the FIN
arrived on is the very socket the teardown just released.  It is not
harmless for a dropper that attached something to the path first.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rds_tcp_accept_one() is such a dropper.  Its path claim in
rds_tcp_accept_one_path() transitions RDS_CONN_DOWN -&amp;gt;
RDS_CONN_CONNECTING, and a concurrent drop - a FIN on a previous
socket in softirq context, an administrative reset - can put the path
into RDS_CONN_ERROR between that claim and the state check that
follows, which accepts RDS_CONN_ERROR.  The accept then installs the
freshly accepted socket with rds_tcp_set_callbacks() while the queued
teardown - which sampled tc-&amp;gt;t_sock before this socket existed - is
still running.  rds_connect_path_complete() fails its transition to
RDS_CONN_UP and drops the path again, queueing the pass that should
r…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-v6pw-c666-7jqh</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-98068</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98068</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/rds: don&amp;#39;t let rds_conn_shutdown() consume a concurrent drop rds_conn_shutdown() finishes by moving the path from RDS_CONN_DISCONNECTING to RDS_CONN_DOWN, and also accepts RDS_CONN_ERROR as the starting state of that final transition, so that a FIN processed in softirq context during the teardown does not derail the shutdown into a noisy error path. But consuming that RDS_CONN_ERROR also consumes the shutdown pass that came with it: rds_conn_path_drop() sets RDS_CONN_ERROR and then queues cp_down_w, and a pass that starts on a path already in RDS_CONN_DOWN is a no-op.  For the FIN case that is harmless - the socket the FIN arrived on is the very socket the teardown just released.  It is not harmless for a dropper that attached something to the path first. rds_tcp_accept_one() is such a dropper.  Its path claim in rds_tcp_accept_one_path() transitions RDS_CONN_DOWN -&amp;gt; RDS_CONN_CONNECTING, and a concurrent drop - a FIN on a previous socket in softirq context, an administrative reset - can put the path into RDS_CONN_ERROR between that claim and the state check that follows, which accepts RDS_CONN_ERROR.  The accept then installs the freshly accepted socket with rds_tcp_set_callbacks() while the queued teardown - which sampled tc-&amp;gt;t_sock before this socket existed - is still running.  rds_connect_path_complete() fails its transition to RDS_CONN_UP and drops the path again, queueing the pass that should reap…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/rds: don&amp;#39;t let rds_conn_shutdown() consume a concurrent drop rds_conn_shutdown() finishes by moving the path from RDS_CONN_DISCONNECTING to RDS_CONN_DOWN, and also accepts RDS_CONN_ERROR as the starting state of that final transition, so that a FIN processed in softirq context during the teardown does not derail the shutdown into a noisy error path. But consuming that RDS_CONN_ERROR also consumes the shutdown pass that came with it: rds_conn_path_drop() sets RDS_CONN_ERROR and then queues cp_down_w, and a pass that starts on a path already in RDS_CONN_DOWN is a no-op.  For the FIN case that is harmless - the socket the FIN arrived on is the very socket the teardown just released.  It is not harmless for a dropper that attached something to the path first. rds_tcp_accept_one() is such a dropper.  Its path claim in rds_tcp_accept_one_path() transitions RDS_CONN_DOWN -&amp;gt; RDS_CONN_CONNECTING, and a concurrent drop - a FIN on a previous socket in softirq context, an administrative reset - can put the path into RDS_CONN_ERROR between that claim and the state check that follows, which accepts RDS_CONN_ERROR.  The accept then installs the freshly accepted socket with rds_tcp_set_callbacks() while the queued teardown - which sampled tc-&amp;gt;t_sock before this socket existed - is still running.  rds_connect_path_complete() fails its transition to RDS_CONN_UP and drops the path again, queueing the pass that should reap…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98068</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3579 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3579</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen oder nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen oder nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3579</guid>
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