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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 18:21:01 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-98022</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98022</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: cap tx_queue_len at S16_MAX to prevent oversized ring allocations&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Several subsystems allocate ring buffers sized by dev-&amp;gt;tx_queue_len
with no upper bound. An unprivileged user (via unshare -Urn) can set a
huge tx_queue_len and exhaust global memory with ring allocations:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- pfifo_fast: pfifo_fast_init() and pfifo_fast_change_tx_queue_len()
  allocate 3 skb_array rings of tx_queue_len entries each.
- tun: tun_queue_resize() and the queue-attach path resize ptr_rings
  to tx_queue_len on the NETDEV_CHANGE_TX_QUEUE_LEN notifier.
- tap (macvtap/ipvtap): tap_queue_resize() and tap_init() resize/init
  ptr_rings to tx_queue_len on the same notifier.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netif_change_tx_queue_len() is the single entry point for IFLA_TXQLEN,
sysfs, and the SIOCSIFTXQLEN ioctl. Cap new_len at S16_MAX (32767)
there so the oversized value is rejected at set time. This takes
effect whether the device is up or down, before dev-&amp;gt;tx_queue_len is
written, before any notifier fires, and before any ring is allocated.
The &amp;#34;&amp;gt; S16_MAX&amp;#34; check also subsumes the previous unsigned-long
truncation test, and a negative ifr_qlen from the ioctl lands far
above the cap after conversion, so both old failure modes are covered
by the one comparison.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tx_queue_len is ambigious: both a per-ring sizing multiplier and a
default queue-length/limit knob for consumers that allocate
nothing at set time (pfifo/bfifo/gred/plug/sfb limits, htb
direct_qlen, qfq max…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: cap tx_queue_len at S16_MAX to prevent oversized ring allocations&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Several subsystems allocate ring buffers sized by dev-&amp;gt;tx_queue_len
with no upper bound. An unprivileged user (via unshare -Urn) can set a
huge tx_queue_len and exhaust global memory with ring allocations:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- pfifo_fast: pfifo_fast_init() and pfifo_fast_change_tx_queue_len()
  allocate 3 skb_array rings of tx_queue_len entries each.
- tun: tun_queue_resize() and the queue-attach path resize ptr_rings
  to tx_queue_len on the NETDEV_CHANGE_TX_QUEUE_LEN notifier.
- tap (macvtap/ipvtap): tap_queue_resize() and tap_init() resize/init
  ptr_rings to tx_queue_len on the same notifier.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netif_change_tx_queue_len() is the single entry point for IFLA_TXQLEN,
sysfs, and the SIOCSIFTXQLEN ioctl. Cap new_len at S16_MAX (32767)
there so the oversized value is rejected at set time. This takes
effect whether the device is up or down, before dev-&amp;gt;tx_queue_len is
written, before any notifier fires, and before any ring is allocated.
The &amp;#34;&amp;gt; S16_MAX&amp;#34; check also subsumes the previous unsigned-long
truncation test, and a negative ifr_qlen from the ioctl lands far
above the cap after conversion, so both old failure modes are covered
by the one comparison.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tx_queue_len is ambigious: both a per-ring sizing multiplier and a
default queue-length/limit knob for consumers that allocate
nothing at set time (pfifo/bfifo/gred/plug/sfb limits, htb
direct_qlen, qfq max…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98022</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-vfx5-qp78-q7gw</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-vfx5-qp78-q7gw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: cap tx_queue_len at S16_MAX to prevent oversized ring allocations&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Several subsystems allocate ring buffers sized by dev-&amp;gt;tx_queue_len
with no upper bound. An unprivileged user (via unshare -Urn) can set a
huge tx_queue_len and exhaust global memory with ring allocations:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- pfifo_fast: pfifo_fast_init() and pfifo_fast_change_tx_queue_len()
  allocate 3 skb_array rings of tx_queue_len entries each.
- tun: tun_queue_resize() and the queue-attach path resize ptr_rings
  to tx_queue_len on the NETDEV_CHANGE_TX_QUEUE_LEN notifier.
- tap (macvtap/ipvtap): tap_queue_resize() and tap_init() resize/init
  ptr_rings to tx_queue_len on the same notifier.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netif_change_tx_queue_len() is the single entry point for IFLA_TXQLEN,
sysfs, and the SIOCSIFTXQLEN ioctl. Cap new_len at S16_MAX (32767)
there so the oversized value is rejected at set time. This takes
effect whether the device is up or down, before dev-&amp;gt;tx_queue_len is
written, before any notifier fires, and before any ring is allocated.
The &amp;#34;&amp;gt; S16_MAX&amp;#34; check also subsumes the previous unsigned-long
truncation test, and a negative ifr_qlen from the ioctl lands far
above the cap after conversion, so both old failure modes are covered
by the one comparison.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tx_queue_len is ambigious: both a per-ring sizing multiplier and a
default queue-length/limit knob for consumers that allocate
nothing at set time (pfifo/bfifo/gred/plug/sfb limits, htb
direct_qlen, qfq max…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: cap tx_queue_len at S16_MAX to prevent oversized ring allocations&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Several subsystems allocate ring buffers sized by dev-&amp;gt;tx_queue_len
with no upper bound. An unprivileged user (via unshare -Urn) can set a
huge tx_queue_len and exhaust global memory with ring allocations:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- pfifo_fast: pfifo_fast_init() and pfifo_fast_change_tx_queue_len()
  allocate 3 skb_array rings of tx_queue_len entries each.
- tun: tun_queue_resize() and the queue-attach path resize ptr_rings
  to tx_queue_len on the NETDEV_CHANGE_TX_QUEUE_LEN notifier.
- tap (macvtap/ipvtap): tap_queue_resize() and tap_init() resize/init
  ptr_rings to tx_queue_len on the same notifier.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netif_change_tx_queue_len() is the single entry point for IFLA_TXQLEN,
sysfs, and the SIOCSIFTXQLEN ioctl. Cap new_len at S16_MAX (32767)
there so the oversized value is rejected at set time. This takes
effect whether the device is up or down, before dev-&amp;gt;tx_queue_len is
written, before any notifier fires, and before any ring is allocated.
The &amp;#34;&amp;gt; S16_MAX&amp;#34; check also subsumes the previous unsigned-long
truncation test, and a negative ifr_qlen from the ioctl lands far
above the cap after conversion, so both old failure modes are covered
by the one comparison.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tx_queue_len is ambigious: both a per-ring sizing multiplier and a
default queue-length/limit knob for consumers that allocate
nothing at set time (pfifo/bfifo/gred/plug/sfb limits, htb
direct_qlen, qfq max…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-vfx5-qp78-q7gw</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-98022</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98022</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: cap tx_queue_len at S16_MAX to prevent oversized ring allocations Several subsystems allocate ring buffers sized by dev-&amp;gt;tx_queue_len with no upper bound. An unprivileged user (via unshare -Urn) can set a huge tx_queue_len and exhaust global memory with ring allocations: - pfifo_fast: pfifo_fast_init() and pfifo_fast_change_tx_queue_len()   allocate 3 skb_array rings of tx_queue_len entries each. - tun: tun_queue_resize() and the queue-attach path resize ptr_rings   to tx_queue_len on the NETDEV_CHANGE_TX_QUEUE_LEN notifier. - tap (macvtap/ipvtap): tap_queue_resize() and tap_init() resize/init   ptr_rings to tx_queue_len on the same notifier. netif_change_tx_queue_len() is the single entry point for IFLA_TXQLEN, sysfs, and the SIOCSIFTXQLEN ioctl. Cap new_len at S16_MAX (32767) there so the oversized value is rejected at set time. This takes effect whether the device is up or down, before dev-&amp;gt;tx_queue_len is written, before any notifier fires, and before any ring is allocated. The &amp;#34;&amp;gt; S16_MAX&amp;#34; check also subsumes the previous unsigned-long truncation test, and a negative ifr_qlen from the ioctl lands far above the cap after conversion, so both old failure modes are covered by the one comparison. tx_queue_len is ambigious: both a per-ring sizing multiplier and a default queue-length/limit knob for consumers that allocate nothing at set time (pfifo/bfifo/gred/plug/sfb limits, htb direct_qlen, qfq max_clas…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: cap tx_queue_len at S16_MAX to prevent oversized ring allocations Several subsystems allocate ring buffers sized by dev-&amp;gt;tx_queue_len with no upper bound. An unprivileged user (via unshare -Urn) can set a huge tx_queue_len and exhaust global memory with ring allocations: - pfifo_fast: pfifo_fast_init() and pfifo_fast_change_tx_queue_len()   allocate 3 skb_array rings of tx_queue_len entries each. - tun: tun_queue_resize() and the queue-attach path resize ptr_rings   to tx_queue_len on the NETDEV_CHANGE_TX_QUEUE_LEN notifier. - tap (macvtap/ipvtap): tap_queue_resize() and tap_init() resize/init   ptr_rings to tx_queue_len on the same notifier. netif_change_tx_queue_len() is the single entry point for IFLA_TXQLEN, sysfs, and the SIOCSIFTXQLEN ioctl. Cap new_len at S16_MAX (32767) there so the oversized value is rejected at set time. This takes effect whether the device is up or down, before dev-&amp;gt;tx_queue_len is written, before any notifier fires, and before any ring is allocated. The &amp;#34;&amp;gt; S16_MAX&amp;#34; check also subsumes the previous unsigned-long truncation test, and a negative ifr_qlen from the ioctl lands far above the cap after conversion, so both old failure modes are covered by the one comparison. tx_queue_len is ambigious: both a per-ring sizing multiplier and a default queue-length/limit knob for consumers that allocate nothing at set time (pfifo/bfifo/gred/plug/sfb limits, htb direct_qlen, qfq max_clas…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98022</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3579 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3579</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen oder nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen oder nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3579</guid>
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