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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 16:05:45 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-97952</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-97952</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sunvdc: unmap LDC cookies when the descriptor send fails&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__send_request() maps the request&amp;#39;s pages into the LDC channel&amp;#39;s map
table (ldc_map_sg()), fills in the descriptor and marks it
VIO_DESC_READY before ringing the doorbell via __vdc_tx_trigger().
When the trigger fails, the error path only prints a message: the
descriptor stays READY and the cookies are never unmapped. The
mapping is normally released in vdc_end_one() when the peer completes
the descriptor - but a descriptor whose doorbell was never sent will
never complete, and since dr-&amp;gt;prod is not advanced on failure, the
reset path (vdc_requeue_inflight(), which walks [cons, prod)) never
visits it either. The map table entries are leaked permanently.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since commit a11f6ca9aef9 (&amp;#34;sunvdc: Do not spin in an infinite loop
when vio_ldc_send() returns EAGAIN&amp;#34;) trigger failures occur in
practice under load, so every resulting I/O error also leaks one
request&amp;#39;s worth of entries from the fixed-size (8192 entries per
channel) map table. Because the allocator hands out contiguous
ranges, fragmentation makes large multi-segment requests fail first
as the table drains, until ldc_map_sg() fails permanently and the
disk is dead until reboot.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It also makes any retry-based recovery unusable: requeuing the
request on -EAGAIN remaps the pages on every attempt, overwriting
desc-&amp;gt;cookies and orphaning the previous mapping, so the table
drains at the retry rate. This…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sunvdc: unmap LDC cookies when the descriptor send fails&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__send_request() maps the request&amp;#39;s pages into the LDC channel&amp;#39;s map
table (ldc_map_sg()), fills in the descriptor and marks it
VIO_DESC_READY before ringing the doorbell via __vdc_tx_trigger().
When the trigger fails, the error path only prints a message: the
descriptor stays READY and the cookies are never unmapped. The
mapping is normally released in vdc_end_one() when the peer completes
the descriptor - but a descriptor whose doorbell was never sent will
never complete, and since dr-&amp;gt;prod is not advanced on failure, the
reset path (vdc_requeue_inflight(), which walks [cons, prod)) never
visits it either. The map table entries are leaked permanently.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since commit a11f6ca9aef9 (&amp;#34;sunvdc: Do not spin in an infinite loop
when vio_ldc_send() returns EAGAIN&amp;#34;) trigger failures occur in
practice under load, so every resulting I/O error also leaks one
request&amp;#39;s worth of entries from the fixed-size (8192 entries per
channel) map table. Because the allocator hands out contiguous
ranges, fragmentation makes large multi-segment requests fail first
as the table drains, until ldc_map_sg() fails permanently and the
disk is dead until reboot.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It also makes any retry-based recovery unusable: requeuing the
request on -EAGAIN remaps the pages on every attempt, overwriting
desc-&amp;gt;cookies and orphaning the previous mapping, so the table
drains at the retry rate. This…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-97952</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-gjc3-h94h-x64h</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-gjc3-h94h-x64h</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sunvdc: unmap LDC cookies when the descriptor send fails&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__send_request() maps the request&amp;#39;s pages into the LDC channel&amp;#39;s map
table (ldc_map_sg()), fills in the descriptor and marks it
VIO_DESC_READY before ringing the doorbell via __vdc_tx_trigger().
When the trigger fails, the error path only prints a message: the
descriptor stays READY and the cookies are never unmapped. The
mapping is normally released in vdc_end_one() when the peer completes
the descriptor - but a descriptor whose doorbell was never sent will
never complete, and since dr-&amp;gt;prod is not advanced on failure, the
reset path (vdc_requeue_inflight(), which walks [cons, prod)) never
visits it either. The map table entries are leaked permanently.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since commit a11f6ca9aef9 (&amp;#34;sunvdc: Do not spin in an infinite loop
when vio_ldc_send() returns EAGAIN&amp;#34;) trigger failures occur in
practice under load, so every resulting I/O error also leaks one
request&amp;#39;s worth of entries from the fixed-size (8192 entries per
channel) map table. Because the allocator hands out contiguous
ranges, fragmentation makes large multi-segment requests fail first
as the table drains, until ldc_map_sg() fails permanently and the
disk is dead until reboot.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It also makes any retry-based recovery unusable: requeuing the
request on -EAGAIN remaps the pages on every attempt, overwriting
desc-&amp;gt;cookies and orphaning the previous mapping, so the table
drains at the retry rate. This…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sunvdc: unmap LDC cookies when the descriptor send fails&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__send_request() maps the request&amp;#39;s pages into the LDC channel&amp;#39;s map
table (ldc_map_sg()), fills in the descriptor and marks it
VIO_DESC_READY before ringing the doorbell via __vdc_tx_trigger().
When the trigger fails, the error path only prints a message: the
descriptor stays READY and the cookies are never unmapped. The
mapping is normally released in vdc_end_one() when the peer completes
the descriptor - but a descriptor whose doorbell was never sent will
never complete, and since dr-&amp;gt;prod is not advanced on failure, the
reset path (vdc_requeue_inflight(), which walks [cons, prod)) never
visits it either. The map table entries are leaked permanently.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since commit a11f6ca9aef9 (&amp;#34;sunvdc: Do not spin in an infinite loop
when vio_ldc_send() returns EAGAIN&amp;#34;) trigger failures occur in
practice under load, so every resulting I/O error also leaks one
request&amp;#39;s worth of entries from the fixed-size (8192 entries per
channel) map table. Because the allocator hands out contiguous
ranges, fragmentation makes large multi-segment requests fail first
as the table drains, until ldc_map_sg() fails permanently and the
disk is dead until reboot.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It also makes any retry-based recovery unusable: requeuing the
request on -EAGAIN remaps the pages on every attempt, overwriting
desc-&amp;gt;cookies and orphaning the previous mapping, so the table
drains at the retry rate. This…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-gjc3-h94h-x64h</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-97952</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-97952</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunvdc: unmap LDC cookies when the descriptor send fails __send_request() maps the request&amp;#39;s pages into the LDC channel&amp;#39;s map table (ldc_map_sg()), fills in the descriptor and marks it VIO_DESC_READY before ringing the doorbell via __vdc_tx_trigger(). When the trigger fails, the error path only prints a message: the descriptor stays READY and the cookies are never unmapped. The mapping is normally released in vdc_end_one() when the peer completes the descriptor - but a descriptor whose doorbell was never sent will never complete, and since dr-&amp;gt;prod is not advanced on failure, the reset path (vdc_requeue_inflight(), which walks [cons, prod)) never visits it either. The map table entries are leaked permanently. Since commit a11f6ca9aef9 (&amp;#34;sunvdc: Do not spin in an infinite loop when vio_ldc_send() returns EAGAIN&amp;#34;) trigger failures occur in practice under load, so every resulting I/O error also leaks one request&amp;#39;s worth of entries from the fixed-size (8192 entries per channel) map table. Because the allocator hands out contiguous ranges, fragmentation makes large multi-segment requests fail first as the table drains, until ldc_map_sg() fails permanently and the disk is dead until reboot. It also makes any retry-based recovery unusable: requeuing the request on -EAGAIN remaps the pages on every attempt, overwriting desc-&amp;gt;cookies and orphaning the previous mapping, so the table drains at the retry rate. This is t…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunvdc: unmap LDC cookies when the descriptor send fails __send_request() maps the request&amp;#39;s pages into the LDC channel&amp;#39;s map table (ldc_map_sg()), fills in the descriptor and marks it VIO_DESC_READY before ringing the doorbell via __vdc_tx_trigger(). When the trigger fails, the error path only prints a message: the descriptor stays READY and the cookies are never unmapped. The mapping is normally released in vdc_end_one() when the peer completes the descriptor - but a descriptor whose doorbell was never sent will never complete, and since dr-&amp;gt;prod is not advanced on failure, the reset path (vdc_requeue_inflight(), which walks [cons, prod)) never visits it either. The map table entries are leaked permanently. Since commit a11f6ca9aef9 (&amp;#34;sunvdc: Do not spin in an infinite loop when vio_ldc_send() returns EAGAIN&amp;#34;) trigger failures occur in practice under load, so every resulting I/O error also leaks one request&amp;#39;s worth of entries from the fixed-size (8192 entries per channel) map table. Because the allocator hands out contiguous ranges, fragmentation makes large multi-segment requests fail first as the table drains, until ldc_map_sg() fails permanently and the disk is dead until reboot. It also makes any retry-based recovery unusable: requeuing the request on -EAGAIN remaps the pages on every attempt, overwriting desc-&amp;gt;cookies and orphaning the previous mapping, so the table drains at the retry rate. This is t…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-97952</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3579 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3579</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen oder nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen oder nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3579</guid>
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