<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 15:19:01 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-97936</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-97936</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tracing: Fix memory corruption from the histogram stacktrace modifier&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;parse_field() sets HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE from the &amp;#34;.stacktrace&amp;#34;
modifier before it looks the field name up, and nothing afterwards
checks that the name resolved to a field which holds a stacktrace.
create_hist_field() picks HIST_FIELD_FN_STACK on the strength of the
field pointer alone, which reads a __data_loc word from the record and
follows its low 16 bits as an offset into the same record.
event_hist_trigger() takes the first word there as an entry count and
copies that many longs into a 31 entry array:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;n_entries = *stack;
	memcpy(entries, ++stack, n_entries * sizeof(unsigned long));&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Neither end of that copy is bounded, and the count is whatever the event
holds at the offset, so any field will do:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# cd /sys/kernel/tracing/events/sched/sched_process_fork
  # echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=parent_pid.stacktrace&amp;#39; &amp;gt; trigger
  # (true)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
  RIP: 0010:rb_insert_color+0x18/0x130
   timerqueue_linked_add+0x7e/0xd0
   enqueue_hrtimer+0x39/0xb0
   __hrtimer_run_queues+0x10f/0x1f0
   &amp;lt;/IRQ&amp;gt;
  RIP: 0010:memcpy+0xc/0x30
   event_hist_trigger+0x165/0x690&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The timer interrupt landed on the rbtree the copy had already run over.
No debug options are needed for this; KASAN reports the same write as an
out-of-bounds read of 13835058055416381440 bytes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Documentation/trace/histogram.rst already s…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tracing: Fix memory corruption from the histogram stacktrace modifier&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;parse_field() sets HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE from the &amp;#34;.stacktrace&amp;#34;
modifier before it looks the field name up, and nothing afterwards
checks that the name resolved to a field which holds a stacktrace.
create_hist_field() picks HIST_FIELD_FN_STACK on the strength of the
field pointer alone, which reads a __data_loc word from the record and
follows its low 16 bits as an offset into the same record.
event_hist_trigger() takes the first word there as an entry count and
copies that many longs into a 31 entry array:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;n_entries = *stack;
	memcpy(entries, ++stack, n_entries * sizeof(unsigned long));&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Neither end of that copy is bounded, and the count is whatever the event
holds at the offset, so any field will do:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# cd /sys/kernel/tracing/events/sched/sched_process_fork
  # echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=parent_pid.stacktrace&amp;#39; &amp;gt; trigger
  # (true)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
  RIP: 0010:rb_insert_color+0x18/0x130
   timerqueue_linked_add+0x7e/0xd0
   enqueue_hrtimer+0x39/0xb0
   __hrtimer_run_queues+0x10f/0x1f0
   &amp;lt;/IRQ&amp;gt;
  RIP: 0010:memcpy+0xc/0x30
   event_hist_trigger+0x165/0x690&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The timer interrupt landed on the rbtree the copy had already run over.
No debug options are needed for this; KASAN reports the same write as an
out-of-bounds read of 13835058055416381440 bytes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Documentation/trace/histogram.rst already s…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-97936</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-7w7w-22gx-h2r2</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-7w7w-22gx-h2r2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tracing: Fix memory corruption from the histogram stacktrace modifier&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;parse_field() sets HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE from the &amp;#34;.stacktrace&amp;#34;
modifier before it looks the field name up, and nothing afterwards
checks that the name resolved to a field which holds a stacktrace.
create_hist_field() picks HIST_FIELD_FN_STACK on the strength of the
field pointer alone, which reads a __data_loc word from the record and
follows its low 16 bits as an offset into the same record.
event_hist_trigger() takes the first word there as an entry count and
copies that many longs into a 31 entry array:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;n_entries = *stack;
	memcpy(entries, ++stack, n_entries * sizeof(unsigned long));&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Neither end of that copy is bounded, and the count is whatever the event
holds at the offset, so any field will do:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# cd /sys/kernel/tracing/events/sched/sched_process_fork
  # echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=parent_pid.stacktrace&amp;#39; &amp;gt; trigger
  # (true)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
  RIP: 0010:rb_insert_color+0x18/0x130
   timerqueue_linked_add+0x7e/0xd0
   enqueue_hrtimer+0x39/0xb0
   __hrtimer_run_queues+0x10f/0x1f0
   &amp;lt;/IRQ&amp;gt;
  RIP: 0010:memcpy+0xc/0x30
   event_hist_trigger+0x165/0x690&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The timer interrupt landed on the rbtree the copy had already run over.
No debug options are needed for this; KASAN reports the same write as an
out-of-bounds read of 13835058055416381440 bytes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Documentation/trace/histogram.rst already s…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tracing: Fix memory corruption from the histogram stacktrace modifier&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;parse_field() sets HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE from the &amp;#34;.stacktrace&amp;#34;
modifier before it looks the field name up, and nothing afterwards
checks that the name resolved to a field which holds a stacktrace.
create_hist_field() picks HIST_FIELD_FN_STACK on the strength of the
field pointer alone, which reads a __data_loc word from the record and
follows its low 16 bits as an offset into the same record.
event_hist_trigger() takes the first word there as an entry count and
copies that many longs into a 31 entry array:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;n_entries = *stack;
	memcpy(entries, ++stack, n_entries * sizeof(unsigned long));&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Neither end of that copy is bounded, and the count is whatever the event
holds at the offset, so any field will do:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# cd /sys/kernel/tracing/events/sched/sched_process_fork
  # echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=parent_pid.stacktrace&amp;#39; &amp;gt; trigger
  # (true)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
  RIP: 0010:rb_insert_color+0x18/0x130
   timerqueue_linked_add+0x7e/0xd0
   enqueue_hrtimer+0x39/0xb0
   __hrtimer_run_queues+0x10f/0x1f0
   &amp;lt;/IRQ&amp;gt;
  RIP: 0010:memcpy+0xc/0x30
   event_hist_trigger+0x165/0x690&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The timer interrupt landed on the rbtree the copy had already run over.
No debug options are needed for this; KASAN reports the same write as an
out-of-bounds read of 13835058055416381440 bytes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Documentation/trace/histogram.rst already s…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-7w7w-22gx-h2r2</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-97936</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-97936</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix memory corruption from the histogram stacktrace modifier parse_field() sets HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE from the &amp;#34;.stacktrace&amp;#34; modifier before it looks the field name up, and nothing afterwards checks that the name resolved to a field which holds a stacktrace. create_hist_field() picks HIST_FIELD_FN_STACK on the strength of the field pointer alone, which reads a __data_loc word from the record and follows its low 16 bits as an offset into the same record. event_hist_trigger() takes the first word there as an entry count and copies that many longs into a 31 entry array: 	n_entries = *stack; 	memcpy(entries, ++stack, n_entries * sizeof(unsigned long)); Neither end of that copy is bounded, and the count is whatever the event holds at the offset, so any field will do:   # cd /sys/kernel/tracing/events/sched/sched_process_fork   # echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=parent_pid.stacktrace&amp;#39; &amp;gt; trigger   # (true)   BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008   RIP: 0010:rb_insert_color+0x18/0x130    timerqueue_linked_add+0x7e/0xd0    enqueue_hrtimer+0x39/0xb0    __hrtimer_run_queues+0x10f/0x1f0    &amp;lt;/IRQ&amp;gt;   RIP: 0010:memcpy+0xc/0x30    event_hist_trigger+0x165/0x690 The timer interrupt landed on the rbtree the copy had already run over. No debug options are needed for this; KASAN reports the same write as an out-of-bounds read of 13835058055416381440 bytes. Documentation/trace/histogram.rst already states th…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix memory corruption from the histogram stacktrace modifier parse_field() sets HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE from the &amp;#34;.stacktrace&amp;#34; modifier before it looks the field name up, and nothing afterwards checks that the name resolved to a field which holds a stacktrace. create_hist_field() picks HIST_FIELD_FN_STACK on the strength of the field pointer alone, which reads a __data_loc word from the record and follows its low 16 bits as an offset into the same record. event_hist_trigger() takes the first word there as an entry count and copies that many longs into a 31 entry array: 	n_entries = *stack; 	memcpy(entries, ++stack, n_entries * sizeof(unsigned long)); Neither end of that copy is bounded, and the count is whatever the event holds at the offset, so any field will do:   # cd /sys/kernel/tracing/events/sched/sched_process_fork   # echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=parent_pid.stacktrace&amp;#39; &amp;gt; trigger   # (true)   BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008   RIP: 0010:rb_insert_color+0x18/0x130    timerqueue_linked_add+0x7e/0xd0    enqueue_hrtimer+0x39/0xb0    __hrtimer_run_queues+0x10f/0x1f0    &amp;lt;/IRQ&amp;gt;   RIP: 0010:memcpy+0xc/0x30    event_hist_trigger+0x165/0x690 The timer interrupt landed on the rbtree the copy had already run over. No debug options are needed for this; KASAN reports the same write as an out-of-bounds read of 13835058055416381440 bytes. Documentation/trace/histogram.rst already states th…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-97936</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3579 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3579</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen oder nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen oder nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3579</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
