<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 22:50:35 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-96561</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-96561</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The AI Engine – The Chatbot, AI Framework &amp;amp; MCP for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting in versions up to, and including, 3.8.0 This is due to a chain of missing input neutralization and output escaping across the /mwai-ui/v1/chats/submit REST endpoint, the PHP error-log parser (MeowKit_MWAI_Helpers::php_error_logs), the Advisor task (Meow_MWAI_Modules_Advisor::run_advisor), and the Advisor dashboard widget (advisor_metabox): the server-parameter denylist in chat_submit strips only exact key names such as &amp;#39;model&amp;#39; while convert_keys() later canonicalizes &amp;#39;model_&amp;#39; back to &amp;#39;model&amp;#39;, allowing an unauthenticated caller to place an attacker-controlled string (including CR/LF) into $query-&amp;gt;model; final_checks() throws an Exception whose message embeds that raw string, and the non-streaming, non-admin catch branch writes it to the PHP error log unmodified — creating a forged log line that the plugin&amp;#39;s own parser subsequently returns as recent PHP-error content; run_advisor() then appends that content verbatim to the AI prompt (indirect prompt injection — CWE-1427), the returned JSON is stored in the mwai_advisor_data option with no schema validation or HTML sanitization, and advisor_metabox() concatenates the resulting &amp;#39;title&amp;#39; and &amp;#39;description&amp;#39; values directly into the WordPress dashboard widget without esc_html(), wp_kses(), or equivalent escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages th…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The AI Engine – The Chatbot, AI Framework &amp;amp; MCP for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting in versions up to, and including, 3.8.0 This is due to a chain of missing input neutralization and output escaping across the /mwai-ui/v1/chats/submit REST endpoint, the PHP error-log parser (MeowKit_MWAI_Helpers::php_error_logs), the Advisor task (Meow_MWAI_Modules_Advisor::run_advisor), and the Advisor dashboard widget (advisor_metabox): the server-parameter denylist in chat_submit strips only exact key names such as &amp;#39;model&amp;#39; while convert_keys() later canonicalizes &amp;#39;model_&amp;#39; back to &amp;#39;model&amp;#39;, allowing an unauthenticated caller to place an attacker-controlled string (including CR/LF) into $query-&amp;gt;model; final_checks() throws an Exception whose message embeds that raw string, and the non-streaming, non-admin catch branch writes it to the PHP error log unmodified — creating a forged log line that the plugin&amp;#39;s own parser subsequently returns as recent PHP-error content; run_advisor() then appends that content verbatim to the AI prompt (indirect prompt injection — CWE-1427), the returned JSON is stored in the mwai_advisor_data option with no schema validation or HTML sanitization, and advisor_metabox() concatenates the resulting &amp;#39;title&amp;#39; and &amp;#39;description&amp;#39; values directly into the WordPress dashboard widget without esc_html(), wp_kses(), or equivalent escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages th…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-96561</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-h282-rvgq-85qj</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-h282-rvgq-85qj</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The AI Engine – The Chatbot, AI Framework &amp;amp; MCP for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting in versions up to, and including, 3.8.0 This is due to a chain of missing input neutralization and output escaping across the /mwai-ui/v1/chats/submit REST endpoint, the PHP error-log parser (MeowKit_MWAI_Helpers::php_error_logs), the Advisor task (Meow_MWAI_Modules_Advisor::run_advisor), and the Advisor dashboard widget (advisor_metabox): the server-parameter denylist in chat_submit strips only exact key names such as &amp;#39;model&amp;#39; while convert_keys() later canonicalizes &amp;#39;model_&amp;#39; back to &amp;#39;model&amp;#39;, allowing an unauthenticated caller to place an attacker-controlled string (including CR/LF) into $query-&amp;gt;model; final_checks() throws an Exception whose message embeds that raw string, and the non-streaming, non-admin catch branch writes it to the PHP error log unmodified — creating a forged log line that the plugin&amp;#39;s own parser subsequently returns as recent PHP-error content; run_advisor() then appends that content verbatim to the AI prompt (indirect prompt injection — CWE-1427), the returned JSON is stored in the mwai_advisor_data option with no schema validation or HTML sanitization, and advisor_metabox() concatenates the resulting &amp;#39;title&amp;#39; and &amp;#39;description&amp;#39; values directly into the WordPress dashboard widget without esc_html(), wp_kses(), or equivalent escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages th…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The AI Engine – The Chatbot, AI Framework &amp;amp; MCP for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting in versions up to, and including, 3.8.0 This is due to a chain of missing input neutralization and output escaping across the /mwai-ui/v1/chats/submit REST endpoint, the PHP error-log parser (MeowKit_MWAI_Helpers::php_error_logs), the Advisor task (Meow_MWAI_Modules_Advisor::run_advisor), and the Advisor dashboard widget (advisor_metabox): the server-parameter denylist in chat_submit strips only exact key names such as &amp;#39;model&amp;#39; while convert_keys() later canonicalizes &amp;#39;model_&amp;#39; back to &amp;#39;model&amp;#39;, allowing an unauthenticated caller to place an attacker-controlled string (including CR/LF) into $query-&amp;gt;model; final_checks() throws an Exception whose message embeds that raw string, and the non-streaming, non-admin catch branch writes it to the PHP error log unmodified — creating a forged log line that the plugin&amp;#39;s own parser subsequently returns as recent PHP-error content; run_advisor() then appends that content verbatim to the AI prompt (indirect prompt injection — CWE-1427), the returned JSON is stored in the mwai_advisor_data option with no schema validation or HTML sanitization, and advisor_metabox() concatenates the resulting &amp;#39;title&amp;#39; and &amp;#39;description&amp;#39; values directly into the WordPress dashboard widget without esc_html(), wp_kses(), or equivalent escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages th…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-h282-rvgq-85qj</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
