<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 16:05:45 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-93243</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-93243</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-93243</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-93243</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-93243</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/secretmem: properly account locked pages&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;secretmem accounts folios by treating memory as if it were mlock()&amp;#39;d and
thus limited by the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK limit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However the folios are unevictable and remain so until the inode is
evicted, eliminating usual mlock() semantics - mapping folios then
unmapping them does not clear their unevictable state, since it depends on
AS_UNEVICTABLE, not PG_mlocked.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A user can therefore easily work around the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK limit - simply
map then unmap and VmLck no longer counts the secretmem range.  Worse,
folios are not accounted in the process&amp;#39;s RSS, meaning the OOM killer
won&amp;#39;t know to kill the process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Repeatedly mapping/unmapping (or forking) can then result in the
consumption of all available system memory with unevictable folios and
cause system instability.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A secretmem fd can be passed between processes and over fork so a
per-process limit simply does not make sense, so follow the precedent set
by io_uring, perf, skbuff, iommufd and xdp by tracking the number of
locked pages in user_struct-&amp;gt;locked_vm.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since the scope tracked is actually inode lifetime, the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK
applies per-user not per-process, so it doesn&amp;#39;t make sense to bypass for
users with CAP_IPC_LOCK, therefore remove this bypass.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is simply no reason to carry on marking the mapping as mlock()&amp;#39;d
since it&amp;#39;s misleading and the lifecycle is now correctly handled, so
remove this too.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note th…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/secretmem: properly account locked pages&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;secretmem accounts folios by treating memory as if it were mlock()&amp;#39;d and
thus limited by the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK limit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However the folios are unevictable and remain so until the inode is
evicted, eliminating usual mlock() semantics - mapping folios then
unmapping them does not clear their unevictable state, since it depends on
AS_UNEVICTABLE, not PG_mlocked.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A user can therefore easily work around the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK limit - simply
map then unmap and VmLck no longer counts the secretmem range.  Worse,
folios are not accounted in the process&amp;#39;s RSS, meaning the OOM killer
won&amp;#39;t know to kill the process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Repeatedly mapping/unmapping (or forking) can then result in the
consumption of all available system memory with unevictable folios and
cause system instability.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A secretmem fd can be passed between processes and over fork so a
per-process limit simply does not make sense, so follow the precedent set
by io_uring, perf, skbuff, iommufd and xdp by tracking the number of
locked pages in user_struct-&amp;gt;locked_vm.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since the scope tracked is actually inode lifetime, the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK
applies per-user not per-process, so it doesn&amp;#39;t make sense to bypass for
users with CAP_IPC_LOCK, therefore remove this bypass.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is simply no reason to carry on marking the mapping as mlock()&amp;#39;d
since it&amp;#39;s misleading and the lifecycle is now correctly handled, so
remove this too.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note th…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-93243</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-9q86-wxfp-682m</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-9q86-wxfp-682m</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/secretmem: properly account locked pages&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;secretmem accounts folios by treating memory as if it were mlock()&amp;#39;d and
thus limited by the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK limit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However the folios are unevictable and remain so until the inode is
evicted, eliminating usual mlock() semantics - mapping folios then
unmapping them does not clear their unevictable state, since it depends on
AS_UNEVICTABLE, not PG_mlocked.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A user can therefore easily work around the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK limit - simply
map then unmap and VmLck no longer counts the secretmem range.  Worse,
folios are not accounted in the process&amp;#39;s RSS, meaning the OOM killer
won&amp;#39;t know to kill the process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Repeatedly mapping/unmapping (or forking) can then result in the
consumption of all available system memory with unevictable folios and
cause system instability.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A secretmem fd can be passed between processes and over fork so a
per-process limit simply does not make sense, so follow the precedent set
by io_uring, perf, skbuff, iommufd and xdp by tracking the number of
locked pages in user_struct-&amp;gt;locked_vm.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since the scope tracked is actually inode lifetime, the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK
applies per-user not per-process, so it doesn&amp;#39;t make sense to bypass for
users with CAP_IPC_LOCK, therefore remove this bypass.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is simply no reason to carry on marking the mapping as mlock()&amp;#39;d
since it&amp;#39;s misleading and the lifecycle is now correctly handled, so
remove this too.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note th…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/secretmem: properly account locked pages&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;secretmem accounts folios by treating memory as if it were mlock()&amp;#39;d and
thus limited by the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK limit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However the folios are unevictable and remain so until the inode is
evicted, eliminating usual mlock() semantics - mapping folios then
unmapping them does not clear their unevictable state, since it depends on
AS_UNEVICTABLE, not PG_mlocked.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A user can therefore easily work around the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK limit - simply
map then unmap and VmLck no longer counts the secretmem range.  Worse,
folios are not accounted in the process&amp;#39;s RSS, meaning the OOM killer
won&amp;#39;t know to kill the process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Repeatedly mapping/unmapping (or forking) can then result in the
consumption of all available system memory with unevictable folios and
cause system instability.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A secretmem fd can be passed between processes and over fork so a
per-process limit simply does not make sense, so follow the precedent set
by io_uring, perf, skbuff, iommufd and xdp by tracking the number of
locked pages in user_struct-&amp;gt;locked_vm.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since the scope tracked is actually inode lifetime, the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK
applies per-user not per-process, so it doesn&amp;#39;t make sense to bypass for
users with CAP_IPC_LOCK, therefore remove this bypass.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is simply no reason to carry on marking the mapping as mlock()&amp;#39;d
since it&amp;#39;s misleading and the lifecycle is now correctly handled, so
remove this too.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note th…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-9q86-wxfp-682m</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-93243</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-93243</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/secretmem: properly account locked pages secretmem accounts folios by treating memory as if it were mlock()&amp;#39;d and thus limited by the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK limit. However the folios are unevictable and remain so until the inode is evicted, eliminating usual mlock() semantics - mapping folios then unmapping them does not clear their unevictable state, since it depends on AS_UNEVICTABLE, not PG_mlocked. A user can therefore easily work around the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK limit - simply map then unmap and VmLck no longer counts the secretmem range.  Worse, folios are not accounted in the process&amp;#39;s RSS, meaning the OOM killer won&amp;#39;t know to kill the process. Repeatedly mapping/unmapping (or forking) can then result in the consumption of all available system memory with unevictable folios and cause system instability. A secretmem fd can be passed between processes and over fork so a per-process limit simply does not make sense, so follow the precedent set by io_uring, perf, skbuff, iommufd and xdp by tracking the number of locked pages in user_struct-&amp;gt;locked_vm. Since the scope tracked is actually inode lifetime, the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK applies per-user not per-process, so it doesn&amp;#39;t make sense to bypass for users with CAP_IPC_LOCK, therefore remove this bypass. There is simply no reason to carry on marking the mapping as mlock()&amp;#39;d since it&amp;#39;s misleading and the lifecycle is now correctly handled, so remove this too. Note that secret…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/secretmem: properly account locked pages secretmem accounts folios by treating memory as if it were mlock()&amp;#39;d and thus limited by the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK limit. However the folios are unevictable and remain so until the inode is evicted, eliminating usual mlock() semantics - mapping folios then unmapping them does not clear their unevictable state, since it depends on AS_UNEVICTABLE, not PG_mlocked. A user can therefore easily work around the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK limit - simply map then unmap and VmLck no longer counts the secretmem range.  Worse, folios are not accounted in the process&amp;#39;s RSS, meaning the OOM killer won&amp;#39;t know to kill the process. Repeatedly mapping/unmapping (or forking) can then result in the consumption of all available system memory with unevictable folios and cause system instability. A secretmem fd can be passed between processes and over fork so a per-process limit simply does not make sense, so follow the precedent set by io_uring, perf, skbuff, iommufd and xdp by tracking the number of locked pages in user_struct-&amp;gt;locked_vm. Since the scope tracked is actually inode lifetime, the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK applies per-user not per-process, so it doesn&amp;#39;t make sense to bypass for users with CAP_IPC_LOCK, therefore remove this bypass. There is simply no reason to carry on marking the mapping as mlock()&amp;#39;d since it&amp;#39;s misleading and the lifecycle is now correctly handled, so remove this too. Note that secret…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-93243</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3579 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3579</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen oder nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen oder nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3579</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
