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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 16:08:47 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>Withdrawn: BELL-CVE-2026-93233 — CVE-2026-93233 does not affect BellSoft software</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-93233</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Withdrawn by the publisher.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Withdrawn by the publisher.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-93233</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-93233</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-93233</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/nouveau/dmem: fix callocated underflow on large folio split&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nouveau_dmem_folio_free() drops chunk-&amp;gt;callocated once per freed folio,
while a large (compound) device-private folio is only counted once when
it is allocated.  When such a folio is split, the mm core invokes
-&amp;gt;folio_split() (nouveau_dmem_folio_split()) once for each new
sub-folio, but the hook only fixes up the sub-folio metadata and leaves
chunk-&amp;gt;callocated unchanged.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Each resulting sub-folio is later freed separately, so after a split
the single allocation (+1) is met by N frees (-N), leaving
chunk-&amp;gt;callocated short by N-1.  On the first split/free cycle it
underflows: WARN_ON(!chunk-&amp;gt;callocated) fires, the unsigned counter
wraps and never returns to zero, so the chunk can no longer be
reclaimed (nouveau_dmem_fini() also warns on the leaked count).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Account for the new sub-folio in the split hook, under the same lock as
nouveau_dmem_folio_free(), so the count stays balanced.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/nouveau/dmem: fix callocated underflow on large folio split&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nouveau_dmem_folio_free() drops chunk-&amp;gt;callocated once per freed folio,
while a large (compound) device-private folio is only counted once when
it is allocated.  When such a folio is split, the mm core invokes
-&amp;gt;folio_split() (nouveau_dmem_folio_split()) once for each new
sub-folio, but the hook only fixes up the sub-folio metadata and leaves
chunk-&amp;gt;callocated unchanged.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Each resulting sub-folio is later freed separately, so after a split
the single allocation (+1) is met by N frees (-N), leaving
chunk-&amp;gt;callocated short by N-1.  On the first split/free cycle it
underflows: WARN_ON(!chunk-&amp;gt;callocated) fires, the unsigned counter
wraps and never returns to zero, so the chunk can no longer be
reclaimed (nouveau_dmem_fini() also warns on the leaked count).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Account for the new sub-folio in the split hook, under the same lock as
nouveau_dmem_folio_free(), so the count stays balanced.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-93233</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-xp29-rgmw-chx9</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-xp29-rgmw-chx9</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/nouveau/dmem: fix callocated underflow on large folio split&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nouveau_dmem_folio_free() drops chunk-&amp;gt;callocated once per freed folio,
while a large (compound) device-private folio is only counted once when
it is allocated.  When such a folio is split, the mm core invokes
-&amp;gt;folio_split() (nouveau_dmem_folio_split()) once for each new
sub-folio, but the hook only fixes up the sub-folio metadata and leaves
chunk-&amp;gt;callocated unchanged.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Each resulting sub-folio is later freed separately, so after a split
the single allocation (+1) is met by N frees (-N), leaving
chunk-&amp;gt;callocated short by N-1.  On the first split/free cycle it
underflows: WARN_ON(!chunk-&amp;gt;callocated) fires, the unsigned counter
wraps and never returns to zero, so the chunk can no longer be
reclaimed (nouveau_dmem_fini() also warns on the leaked count).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Account for the new sub-folio in the split hook, under the same lock as
nouveau_dmem_folio_free(), so the count stays balanced.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/nouveau/dmem: fix callocated underflow on large folio split&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nouveau_dmem_folio_free() drops chunk-&amp;gt;callocated once per freed folio,
while a large (compound) device-private folio is only counted once when
it is allocated.  When such a folio is split, the mm core invokes
-&amp;gt;folio_split() (nouveau_dmem_folio_split()) once for each new
sub-folio, but the hook only fixes up the sub-folio metadata and leaves
chunk-&amp;gt;callocated unchanged.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Each resulting sub-folio is later freed separately, so after a split
the single allocation (+1) is met by N frees (-N), leaving
chunk-&amp;gt;callocated short by N-1.  On the first split/free cycle it
underflows: WARN_ON(!chunk-&amp;gt;callocated) fires, the unsigned counter
wraps and never returns to zero, so the chunk can no longer be
reclaimed (nouveau_dmem_fini() also warns on the leaked count).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Account for the new sub-folio in the split hook, under the same lock as
nouveau_dmem_folio_free(), so the count stays balanced.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-xp29-rgmw-chx9</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-93233</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-93233</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/nouveau/dmem: fix callocated underflow on large folio split nouveau_dmem_folio_free() drops chunk-&amp;gt;callocated once per freed folio, while a large (compound) device-private folio is only counted once when it is allocated.  When such a folio is split, the mm core invokes -&amp;gt;folio_split() (nouveau_dmem_folio_split()) once for each new sub-folio, but the hook only fixes up the sub-folio metadata and leaves chunk-&amp;gt;callocated unchanged. Each resulting sub-folio is later freed separately, so after a split the single allocation (+1) is met by N frees (-N), leaving chunk-&amp;gt;callocated short by N-1.  On the first split/free cycle it underflows: WARN_ON(!chunk-&amp;gt;callocated) fires, the unsigned counter wraps and never returns to zero, so the chunk can no longer be reclaimed (nouveau_dmem_fini() also warns on the leaked count). Account for the new sub-folio in the split hook, under the same lock as nouveau_dmem_folio_free(), so the count stays balanced.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/nouveau/dmem: fix callocated underflow on large folio split nouveau_dmem_folio_free() drops chunk-&amp;gt;callocated once per freed folio, while a large (compound) device-private folio is only counted once when it is allocated.  When such a folio is split, the mm core invokes -&amp;gt;folio_split() (nouveau_dmem_folio_split()) once for each new sub-folio, but the hook only fixes up the sub-folio metadata and leaves chunk-&amp;gt;callocated unchanged. Each resulting sub-folio is later freed separately, so after a split the single allocation (+1) is met by N frees (-N), leaving chunk-&amp;gt;callocated short by N-1.  On the first split/free cycle it underflows: WARN_ON(!chunk-&amp;gt;callocated) fires, the unsigned counter wraps and never returns to zero, so the chunk can no longer be reclaimed (nouveau_dmem_fini() also warns on the leaked count). Account for the new sub-folio in the split hook, under the same lock as nouveau_dmem_folio_free(), so the count stays balanced.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-93233</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3579 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3579</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen oder nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen oder nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3579</guid>
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