<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 19:01:18 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-76949</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-76949</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows an attacker who can plant a remember-me cookie in a victim&amp;#39;s browser to replace that victim&amp;#39;s authenticated session with one for the attacker&amp;#39;s own account.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.sign_in_using_remember_me/3 skips re-authenticating an already-signed-in visitor by checking the session for &amp;#34;&amp;lt;subject_name&amp;gt;_token&amp;#34;, but store_in_session/2 writes that key only when require_token_presence_for_authentication? is enabled and otherwise writes the bare subject name. At the default setting the guard therefore reads a key that is never written, its already-signed-in branch is unreachable, and the remember-me sign-in runs on every request through the per-request browser pipeline plug. A planted remember-me cookie is consequently honoured even for a visitor holding a live authenticated session, so whatever the victim enters afterwards lands in data the attacker controls. The read path in authenticate_resource_from_session/4 selects the key correctly, so the guard and the reader disagree about which key holds the session.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.10.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows an attacker who can plant a remember-me cookie in a victim&amp;#39;s browser to replace that victim&amp;#39;s authenticated session with one for the attacker&amp;#39;s own account.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.sign_in_using_remember_me/3 skips re-authenticating an already-signed-in visitor by checking the session for &amp;#34;&amp;lt;subject_name&amp;gt;_token&amp;#34;, but store_in_session/2 writes that key only when require_token_presence_for_authentication? is enabled and otherwise writes the bare subject name. At the default setting the guard therefore reads a key that is never written, its already-signed-in branch is unreachable, and the remember-me sign-in runs on every request through the per-request browser pipeline plug. A planted remember-me cookie is consequently honoured even for a visitor holding a live authenticated session, so whatever the victim enters afterwards lands in data the attacker controls. The read path in authenticate_resource_from_session/4 selects the key correctly, so the guard and the reader disagree about which key holds the session.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.10.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-76949</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
