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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 22:39:38 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-63493</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63493</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Snipe-IT is an IT asset/license management system. Prior to 8.7.0, a password-authenticated session for an account with self.api permission can reach the personal-access-token API flow before completing the account&amp;#39;s second-factor challenge because CheckForTwoFactor is enforced in the web middleware group but not the API middleware group. The advisory states that the resulting persistent API token can read and modify resources with the victim&amp;#39;s permissions and, for an administrator, can reach the users/two_factor_reset endpoint. Resetting the administrator&amp;#39;s enrolled second factor allows the password-holding attacker to enroll an attacker-controlled factor, take over the administrator&amp;#39;s web account, and lock out the legitimate user. The token does not create a web session, but it provides broad API access while the same browser session remains blocked at the two-factor page. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.7.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Snipe-IT is an IT asset/license management system. Prior to 8.7.0, a password-authenticated session for an account with self.api permission can reach the personal-access-token API flow before completing the account&amp;#39;s second-factor challenge because CheckForTwoFactor is enforced in the web middleware group but not the API middleware group. The advisory states that the resulting persistent API token can read and modify resources with the victim&amp;#39;s permissions and, for an administrator, can reach the users/two_factor_reset endpoint. Resetting the administrator&amp;#39;s enrolled second factor allows the password-holding attacker to enroll an attacker-controlled factor, take over the administrator&amp;#39;s web account, and lock out the legitimate user. The token does not create a web session, but it provides broad API access while the same browser session remains blocked at the two-factor page. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.7.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63493</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hxcx-9h4f-42xx — Snipe-IT: 2FA bypass via the API token flow</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-hxcx-9h4f-42xx</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: snipe/snipe-it&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker who knows a victim&amp;#39;s password fully bypasses that account&amp;#39;s 2FA and obtains a persistent token with full API access as the user (read and write across the user&amp;#39;s permissions, including admin if the victim is an admin).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The token is an API credential, not a web/UI session (using it on web routes redirects to `/login`), but the REST API covers essentially the whole application. If the victim is an admin, the token can also call the admin `users/two_factor_reset` endpoint, which is in the same un-gated API surface, to clear the account&amp;#39;s enrolled 2FA. The next login is then forced to re-enroll a second factor, which the password-holding attacker can complete with their own device, taking over the account&amp;#39;s web access and locking the legitimate user out.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2FA is enforced only by the `web` middleware group, not the `api` group, and the personal-access-token endpoint is in the `api` group. A session that has passed the password check but not the 2FA can mint a persistent API token and use it for full API access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`CheckForTwoFactor` is in the `web` group but not the `api` group:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// app/Http/Kernel.php
    &amp;#39;web&amp;#39; =&amp;gt; [ ..., CheckForTwoFactor::class, CreateFreshApiToken::class, ... ],
    &amp;#39;api&amp;#39; =&amp;gt; [ &amp;#39;auth:api&amp;#39;, EnforceApiUserAgent::class, ... ],   // no CheckForTwoFactor&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two consequences:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. `/two-factor` is exempt from the check, and `CreateFreshApiToken` runs right after it in the web group:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// app/Http/Middleware/Ch…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: snipe/snipe-it&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker who knows a victim&amp;#39;s password fully bypasses that account&amp;#39;s 2FA and obtains a persistent token with full API access as the user (read and write across the user&amp;#39;s permissions, including admin if the victim is an admin).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The token is an API credential, not a web/UI session (using it on web routes redirects to `/login`), but the REST API covers essentially the whole application. If the victim is an admin, the token can also call the admin `users/two_factor_reset` endpoint, which is in the same un-gated API surface, to clear the account&amp;#39;s enrolled 2FA. The next login is then forced to re-enroll a second factor, which the password-holding attacker can complete with their own device, taking over the account&amp;#39;s web access and locking the legitimate user out.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2FA is enforced only by the `web` middleware group, not the `api` group, and the personal-access-token endpoint is in the `api` group. A session that has passed the password check but not the 2FA can mint a persistent API token and use it for full API access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`CheckForTwoFactor` is in the `web` group but not the `api` group:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// app/Http/Kernel.php
    &amp;#39;web&amp;#39; =&amp;gt; [ ..., CheckForTwoFactor::class, CreateFreshApiToken::class, ... ],
    &amp;#39;api&amp;#39; =&amp;gt; [ &amp;#39;auth:api&amp;#39;, EnforceApiUserAgent::class, ... ],   // no CheckForTwoFactor&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two consequences:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. `/two-factor` is exempt from the check, and `CreateFreshApiToken` runs right after it in the web group:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// app/Http/Middleware/Ch…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-hxcx-9h4f-42xx</guid>
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