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bdu:2026-14835

fkie_cve-2026-63126

Wire provides gRPC and protocol buffers for Android, Kotlin, Swift, and Java. Prior to 6.4.5 and 7.0.0-alpha04, Wire protobuf readers do not consistently validate attacker-controlled lengths against the current logical message boundary before advancing cursors, pointers, limits, slices, or allocations. In Kotlin, ProtoAdapter.decode(ByteArray) and ProtoAdapter.decode(ByteString) use ByteArrayProtoReader32.internalNextLengthDelimited(), where a positive oversized length can wrap pos + length to a negative limit and escape the existing negative-length check. Related ProtoReader, ReadBuffer.readVarint(), ReadBuffer.verifyAdditional(count:), packed-repeated, nested-message, and ProtoDecoder.decodeSizeDelimited(_:from:) paths can cross logical boundaries, perform pointer arithmetic, reserve capacity, or convert an unrepresentable size before proving the requested bytes exist. An attacker who supplies malformed protobuf bytes can cause unchecked exceptions, traps, out-of-bounds behavior, or excessive allocation, resulting in denial of service without known confidentiality, integrity, or code-execution impact. This issue is fixed in versions 6.4.5 and 7.0.0-alpha04.

GHSA-9rm7-3qhh-h2mc — Wire: Unauthenticated decoder crash via 32-bit length integer overflow in ByteArrayProtoReader32 (incomplete fix of CVE…

Affected: Maven: com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime

Wire's protobuf decoders did not consistently validate attacker-controlled length-delimited sizes against the current reader bounds before computing cursor, limit, or pointer positions.

In the Kotlin runtime, `ProtoAdapter.decode(ByteArray)` and `ProtoAdapter.decode(ByteString)` use the `ProtoReader32` fast path implemented by `ByteArrayProtoReader32`. In `ByteArrayProtoReader32.internalNextLengthDelimited()`, Wire read an untrusted varint length into an `Int` and rejected only negative values. A length such as `2147483647` is non-negative, so it passed that check, but `pos + length` overflowed the signed 32-bit cursor and produced a negative `limit`. The following `if (limit > pushedLimit)` guard did not catch this because the overflowed value was negative.

That invalid limit then reached string, bytes, skip, and scalar-reading paths as an invalid byte count or invalid range. Instead of failing as a checked decode error such as `IOException`, malformed input could throw unchecked runtime exceptions including `IllegalArgumentException` and `ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException`. Applications commonly treat malformed protobuf input as an expected decode failure; unchecked runtime exceptions escaping that boundary can crash request handling or the process.

The original report is a sibling of the negative-length skipped-group bug fixed as CVE-2026-45799. It is not the same bug. The length in this advisory is positive, and the overflow occurs when setting a length-delimited message…