https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 10 Oct 2026 17:50:02 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-62367 <p>Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. In versions 1.0.0 through 2.3.0, when an administrator enables the per-provider `emailfallback` option on an OpenID Connect provider, Vikunja links an SSO login to a pre-existing local (username+password) account using only the `email` claim from the IdP. The fallback never checks an `email_verified` (or Microsoft `xms_edov`) signal and never requires the matched account&#39;s password. An attacker who can obtain a token from the configured issuer carrying a victim&#39;s email logs in as that victim with a full session, with no consent or interaction from the victim. Version 2.4.0 fixes the issue.</p> <p>Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. In versions 1.0.0 through 2.3.0, when an administrator enables the per-provider `emailfallback` option on an OpenID Connect provider, Vikunja links an SSO login to a pre-existing local (username+password) account using only the `email` claim from the IdP. The fallback never checks an `email_verified` (or Microsoft `xms_edov`) signal and never requires the matched account&#39;s password. An attacker who can obtain a token from the configured issuer carrying a victim&#39;s email logs in as that victim with a full session, with no consent or interaction from the victim. Version 2.4.0 fixes the issue.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-62367 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-xv7q-fvmc-jx96 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: code.vikunja.io/api</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>With the per-provider OIDC `emailfallback` option enabled, Vikunja links an SSO login to a pre-existing **local** (username+password) account using only the `email` claim — no `email_verified` (or Microsoft `xms_edov`) check and no password check, on the unauthenticated callback. An attacker who can make the configured issuer emit a token bearing a victim&#39;s email logs in as that victim with a full session and no victim interaction (the nOAuth / Grafana CVE-2023-3128 class). The 2.3.0 fix for GHSA-8jvc-mcx6-r4cg added a TOTP gate, not an `email_verified` gate, so users without TOTP remain exposed.</p> <p>## Details</p> <p>References are `pkg/modules/auth/openid/openid.go` at HEAD. Identity is first resolved on the immutable `(issuer, subject)` pair (`openid.go:428`). On a subject miss with `emailfallback` on, `fallbackSearchUsers` adds an email-only lookup against local accounts:</p> <p>```go // openid.go:413 searches = append(searches, &amp;user.User{Issuer: user.IssuerLocal, Email: cl.Email}) ```</p> <p>`getUser` resolves this via `s.Get()`, which ANDs non-zero fields -&gt; `WHERE issuer=&#39;local&#39; AND email=?`. Local users always have `Issuer=&#34;local&#34;` (`user_create.go:38`), so the lookup matches any local account by email alone; `getOrCreateUser` returns it and the caller mints a session — the password is never read. The `claims` struct has no `email_verified` field (`openid.go:80`) and `getClaims` never consults one; a repo-wide grep for `email_verified`/`xms_edov` returns nothing. The code al…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: code.vikunja.io/api</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>With the per-provider OIDC `emailfallback` option enabled, Vikunja links an SSO login to a pre-existing **local** (username+password) account using only the `email` claim — no `email_verified` (or Microsoft `xms_edov`) check and no password check, on the unauthenticated callback. An attacker who can make the configured issuer emit a token bearing a victim&#39;s email logs in as that victim with a full session and no victim interaction (the nOAuth / Grafana CVE-2023-3128 class). The 2.3.0 fix for GHSA-8jvc-mcx6-r4cg added a TOTP gate, not an `email_verified` gate, so users without TOTP remain exposed.</p> <p>## Details</p> <p>References are `pkg/modules/auth/openid/openid.go` at HEAD. Identity is first resolved on the immutable `(issuer, subject)` pair (`openid.go:428`). On a subject miss with `emailfallback` on, `fallbackSearchUsers` adds an email-only lookup against local accounts:</p> <p>```go // openid.go:413 searches = append(searches, &amp;user.User{Issuer: user.IssuerLocal, Email: cl.Email}) ```</p> <p>`getUser` resolves this via `s.Get()`, which ANDs non-zero fields -&gt; `WHERE issuer=&#39;local&#39; AND email=?`. Local users always have `Issuer=&#34;local&#34;` (`user_create.go:38`), so the lookup matches any local account by email alone; `getOrCreateUser` returns it and the caller mints a session — the password is never read. The `claims` struct has no `email_verified` field (`openid.go:80`) and `getClaims` never consults one; a repo-wide grep for `email_verified`/`xms_edov` returns nothing. The code al…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-xv7q-fvmc-jx96