<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 18:54:58 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-55235</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55235</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;langgraph-api implements the LangGraph API for rapid development and testing. Prior to 0.10.0, langgraph-api permits a run or cron to specify a relative webhook target that is delivered through an in-process loopback transport, and the authentication middleware treats that transport as internal without applying the authentication context used for external requests. In deployments that rely on per-user authorization to separate threads and runs, an authenticated user can direct a webhook to the server&amp;#39;s own thread and run routes, allowing creation of a run on or modification of another user&amp;#39;s thread and limited incorporation of the targeted thread&amp;#39;s metadata into the created run record. The affected path requires webhook targets and per-user authorization boundaries; deployments that deliberately re-enable loopback delivery should restrict it to controlled same-process routes because those webhooks remain unauthenticated. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;langgraph-api implements the LangGraph API for rapid development and testing. Prior to 0.10.0, langgraph-api permits a run or cron to specify a relative webhook target that is delivered through an in-process loopback transport, and the authentication middleware treats that transport as internal without applying the authentication context used for external requests. In deployments that rely on per-user authorization to separate threads and runs, an authenticated user can direct a webhook to the server&amp;#39;s own thread and run routes, allowing creation of a run on or modification of another user&amp;#39;s thread and limited incorporation of the targeted thread&amp;#39;s metadata into the created run record. The affected path requires webhook targets and per-user authorization boundaries; deployments that deliberately re-enable loopback delivery should restrict it to controlled same-process routes because those webhooks remain unauthenticated. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55235</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-2c9q-c2q9-qgqv — langgraph-api: Relative webhook targets in LangGraph Server can reach in-process routes without authentication</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-2c9q-c2q9-qgqv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: langgraph-api&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In affected versions of `langgraph-api` (the LangGraph Server runtime), a run or cron could be created with a relative webhook target. When the server later delivers such a webhook, it routes the request back into the same application through an in-process loopback transport that the authentication middleware treats as internal and does not authenticate. As a result, a relative webhook target could reach the server&amp;#39;s own routes that operate on threads and runs without the authentication context that applies to ordinary external requests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In deployments that scope threads and runs by owner, this could allow a request associated with one user to reach routes operating on another user&amp;#39;s thread, resulting in creation of a run on (or modification of the state of) a thread owned by another user, even where the corresponding direct external requests were correctly denied. Limited metadata from the targeted thread may be incorporated into the created run record.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We have no evidence of this behavior occurring in the wild.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected users / systems&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;You may be affected if you:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- run `langgraph-api` (the LangGraph Server / Agent Server runtime, including via the LangGraph Platform Helm chart),
- allow runs or crons to specify webhook targets, and
- rely on per-user authorization to separate threads and runs between users.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Integrity: creation of a run on, or modification of the state of, a thread owned by another user, beyond the requesting user&amp;#39;s authori…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: langgraph-api&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In affected versions of `langgraph-api` (the LangGraph Server runtime), a run or cron could be created with a relative webhook target. When the server later delivers such a webhook, it routes the request back into the same application through an in-process loopback transport that the authentication middleware treats as internal and does not authenticate. As a result, a relative webhook target could reach the server&amp;#39;s own routes that operate on threads and runs without the authentication context that applies to ordinary external requests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In deployments that scope threads and runs by owner, this could allow a request associated with one user to reach routes operating on another user&amp;#39;s thread, resulting in creation of a run on (or modification of the state of) a thread owned by another user, even where the corresponding direct external requests were correctly denied. Limited metadata from the targeted thread may be incorporated into the created run record.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We have no evidence of this behavior occurring in the wild.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected users / systems&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;You may be affected if you:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- run `langgraph-api` (the LangGraph Server / Agent Server runtime, including via the LangGraph Platform Helm chart),
- allow runs or crons to specify webhook targets, and
- rely on per-user authorization to separate threads and runs between users.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Integrity: creation of a run on, or modification of the state of, a thread owned by another user, beyond the requesting user&amp;#39;s authori…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-2c9q-c2q9-qgqv</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-3857 — langgraph-api: Relative webhook targets in LangGraph Server can reach in-process routes without authentication</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3857</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: langgraph-api&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In affected versions of `langgraph-api` (the LangGraph Server runtime), a run or cron could be created with a relative webhook target. When the server later delivers such a webhook, it routes the request back into the same application through an in-process loopback transport that the authentication middleware treats as internal and does not authenticate. As a result, a relative webhook target could reach the server&amp;#39;s own routes that operate on threads and runs without the authentication context that applies to ordinary external requests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In deployments that scope threads and runs by owner, this could allow a request associated with one user to reach routes operating on another user&amp;#39;s thread, resulting in creation of a run on (or modification of the state of) a thread owned by another user, even where the corresponding direct external requests were correctly denied. Limited metadata from the targeted thread may be incorporated into the created run record.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We have no evidence of this behavior occurring in the wild.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected users / systems&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;You may be affected if you:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- run `langgraph-api` (the LangGraph Server / Agent Server runtime, including via the LangGraph Platform Helm chart),
- allow runs or crons to specify webhook targets, and
- rely on per-user authorization to separate threads and runs between users.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Integrity: creation of a run on, or modification of the state of, a thread owned by another user, beyond the requesting user&amp;#39;s authori…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: langgraph-api&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In affected versions of `langgraph-api` (the LangGraph Server runtime), a run or cron could be created with a relative webhook target. When the server later delivers such a webhook, it routes the request back into the same application through an in-process loopback transport that the authentication middleware treats as internal and does not authenticate. As a result, a relative webhook target could reach the server&amp;#39;s own routes that operate on threads and runs without the authentication context that applies to ordinary external requests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In deployments that scope threads and runs by owner, this could allow a request associated with one user to reach routes operating on another user&amp;#39;s thread, resulting in creation of a run on (or modification of the state of) a thread owned by another user, even where the corresponding direct external requests were correctly denied. Limited metadata from the targeted thread may be incorporated into the created run record.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We have no evidence of this behavior occurring in the wild.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected users / systems&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;You may be affected if you:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- run `langgraph-api` (the LangGraph Server / Agent Server runtime, including via the LangGraph Platform Helm chart),
- allow runs or crons to specify webhook targets, and
- rely on per-user authorization to separate threads and runs between users.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Integrity: creation of a run on, or modification of the state of, a thread owned by another user, beyond the requesting user&amp;#39;s authori…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3857</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
