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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-19807</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-19807</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The ByteCoreStack – MCP Connector for AI Tools plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.3 This is due to the `wp_update_user_meta` MCP tool in `execute_tool` gating writes solely with `current_user_can(&amp;#39;edit_user&amp;#39;, $uid)` — a check that WordPress core&amp;#39;s `map_meta_cap` resolves to the `read` primitive when the target user ID matches the caller&amp;#39;s own — while enforcing an incomplete meta key blocklist that covers only `user_pass`, `user_activation_key`, and `session_tokens`, leaving the `wp_capabilities` and `wp_user_level` meta keys entirely unprotected. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access and above to elevate their privileges to Administrator by issuing a `wp_update_user_meta` call over the MCP JSON-RPC endpoint with `key=wp_capabilities` and an arbitrary role array such as `{&amp;#39;administrator&amp;#39;: true}` targeting their own user ID, causing WordPress to load that account as an Administrator on the next request.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The ByteCoreStack – MCP Connector for AI Tools plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.3 This is due to the `wp_update_user_meta` MCP tool in `execute_tool` gating writes solely with `current_user_can(&amp;#39;edit_user&amp;#39;, $uid)` — a check that WordPress core&amp;#39;s `map_meta_cap` resolves to the `read` primitive when the target user ID matches the caller&amp;#39;s own — while enforcing an incomplete meta key blocklist that covers only `user_pass`, `user_activation_key`, and `session_tokens`, leaving the `wp_capabilities` and `wp_user_level` meta keys entirely unprotected. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access and above to elevate their privileges to Administrator by issuing a `wp_update_user_meta` call over the MCP JSON-RPC endpoint with `key=wp_capabilities` and an arbitrary role array such as `{&amp;#39;administrator&amp;#39;: true}` targeting their own user ID, causing WordPress to load that account as an Administrator on the next request.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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      <title>GHSA-qwvr-5fhh-47xh</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-qwvr-5fhh-47xh</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The ByteCoreStack – MCP Connector for AI Tools plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.3 This is due to the `wp_update_user_meta` MCP tool in `execute_tool` gating writes solely with `current_user_can(&amp;#39;edit_user&amp;#39;, $uid)` — a check that WordPress core&amp;#39;s `map_meta_cap` resolves to the `read` primitive when the target user ID matches the caller&amp;#39;s own — while enforcing an incomplete meta key blocklist that covers only `user_pass`, `user_activation_key`, and `session_tokens`, leaving the `wp_capabilities` and `wp_user_level` meta keys entirely unprotected. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access and above to elevate their privileges to Administrator by issuing a `wp_update_user_meta` call over the MCP JSON-RPC endpoint with `key=wp_capabilities` and an arbitrary role array such as `{&amp;#39;administrator&amp;#39;: true}` targeting their own user ID, causing WordPress to load that account as an Administrator on the next request.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The ByteCoreStack – MCP Connector for AI Tools plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.3 This is due to the `wp_update_user_meta` MCP tool in `execute_tool` gating writes solely with `current_user_can(&amp;#39;edit_user&amp;#39;, $uid)` — a check that WordPress core&amp;#39;s `map_meta_cap` resolves to the `read` primitive when the target user ID matches the caller&amp;#39;s own — while enforcing an incomplete meta key blocklist that covers only `user_pass`, `user_activation_key`, and `session_tokens`, leaving the `wp_capabilities` and `wp_user_level` meta keys entirely unprotected. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access and above to elevate their privileges to Administrator by issuing a `wp_update_user_meta` call over the MCP JSON-RPC endpoint with `key=wp_capabilities` and an arbitrary role array such as `{&amp;#39;administrator&amp;#39;: true}` targeting their own user ID, causing WordPress to load that account as an Administrator on the next request.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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