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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-107335</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107335</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Malcolm&amp;#39;s upload-processing pipeline (scripts/safe-extract.py) enforces entry-count, nesting-depth, and total-uncompressed-byte limits when extracting container archives (zip/tar/rar/7z via libarchive), but those limits are not applied when the uploaded file is a single-stream compressed format (.gz, .bz2, .xz, .lzma, .lz) that isn&amp;#39;t a .tar.*-style archive. Any authenticated user permitted to upload PCAP/log files can upload a small, highly compressible file (e.g. a gzip bomb) that decompresses to an effectively unbounded size on disk, exhausting the shared Docker volume used by OpenSearch, Logstash, Arkime, and Zeek, and disrupting the platform for all users.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Malcolm&amp;#39;s upload-processing pipeline (scripts/safe-extract.py) enforces entry-count, nesting-depth, and total-uncompressed-byte limits when extracting container archives (zip/tar/rar/7z via libarchive), but those limits are not applied when the uploaded file is a single-stream compressed format (.gz, .bz2, .xz, .lzma, .lz) that isn&amp;#39;t a .tar.*-style archive. Any authenticated user permitted to upload PCAP/log files can upload a small, highly compressible file (e.g. a gzip bomb) that decompresses to an effectively unbounded size on disk, exhausting the shared Docker volume used by OpenSearch, Logstash, Arkime, and Zeek, and disrupting the platform for all users.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107335</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-ffq8-c9hx-7wvf</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-ffq8-c9hx-7wvf</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Malcolm&amp;#39;s upload-processing pipeline (scripts/safe-extract.py) enforces entry-count, nesting-depth, and total-uncompressed-byte limits when extracting container archives (zip/tar/rar/7z via libarchive), but those limits are not applied when the uploaded file is a single-stream compressed format (.gz, .bz2, .xz, .lzma, .lz) that isn&amp;#39;t a .tar.*-style archive. Any authenticated user permitted to upload PCAP/log files can upload a small, highly compressible file (e.g. a gzip bomb) that decompresses to an effectively unbounded size on disk, exhausting the shared Docker volume used by OpenSearch, Logstash, Arkime, and Zeek, and disrupting the platform for all users.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Malcolm&amp;#39;s upload-processing pipeline (scripts/safe-extract.py) enforces entry-count, nesting-depth, and total-uncompressed-byte limits when extracting container archives (zip/tar/rar/7z via libarchive), but those limits are not applied when the uploaded file is a single-stream compressed format (.gz, .bz2, .xz, .lzma, .lz) that isn&amp;#39;t a .tar.*-style archive. Any authenticated user permitted to upload PCAP/log files can upload a small, highly compressible file (e.g. a gzip bomb) that decompresses to an effectively unbounded size on disk, exhausting the shared Docker volume used by OpenSearch, Logstash, Arkime, and Zeek, and disrupting the platform for all users.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-ffq8-c9hx-7wvf</guid>
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      <title>ICSA-26-280-01 — CISA Malcolm</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/icsa-26-280-01</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Malcolm&amp;#39;s front nginx reverse proxy defines a &amp;#34;Dashboards → Arkime shortcut&amp;#34; location using a case-insensitive regex matcher but a case-sensitive rewrite. A request whose path segment is not exact-lowercase (for example /IDDASH2ARK/...) enters the location (the matcher fires) but evades the rewrite (no redirect is issued), so nginx falls through to the location&amp;#39;s proxy_pass to the Arkime backend. That location is the one proxied location in the shipped config that does not include the per-location authentication file, so the request reaches Arkime unauthenticated. The same location also forwards a client-supplied X-Forwarded-User header un-overwritten, and Arkime is configured to trust X-Forwarded-User as the authenticated username — so an unauthenticated network caller can reach the Arkime backend while supplying a forged, auto-provisioned identity. Malcolm&amp;#39;s nginx based reverse proxy contains a URL path normalization inconsistency between its Lua based role-based access control (RBAC) authorization layer and nginx&amp;#39;s own request routing logic. An authenticated user can craft a specially formatted request path to bypass role-based restrictions and reach administrative or role gated endpoints they should not have access to. This affects all restricted paths protected by the RBAC authorization layer, including file upload, PHP server, htadmin, and authentication management interfaces. Malcolm file-upload component ships the upstream FilePond PHP server (pqina/filepond-server-p…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Malcolm&amp;#39;s front nginx reverse proxy defines a &amp;#34;Dashboards → Arkime shortcut&amp;#34; location using a case-insensitive regex matcher but a case-sensitive rewrite. A request whose path segment is not exact-lowercase (for example /IDDASH2ARK/...) enters the location (the matcher fires) but evades the rewrite (no redirect is issued), so nginx falls through to the location&amp;#39;s proxy_pass to the Arkime backend. That location is the one proxied location in the shipped config that does not include the per-location authentication file, so the request reaches Arkime unauthenticated. The same location also forwards a client-supplied X-Forwarded-User header un-overwritten, and Arkime is configured to trust X-Forwarded-User as the authenticated username — so an unauthenticated network caller can reach the Arkime backend while supplying a forged, auto-provisioned identity. Malcolm&amp;#39;s nginx based reverse proxy contains a URL path normalization inconsistency between its Lua based role-based access control (RBAC) authorization layer and nginx&amp;#39;s own request routing logic. An authenticated user can craft a specially formatted request path to bypass role-based restrictions and reach administrative or role gated endpoints they should not have access to. This affects all restricted paths protected by the RBAC authorization layer, including file upload, PHP server, htadmin, and authentication management interfaces. Malcolm file-upload component ships the upstream FilePond PHP server (pqina/filepond-server-p…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/icsa-26-280-01</guid>
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