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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-100663</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-100663</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Netty&amp;#39;s HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) from 4.2.2.Final through 4.2.17.Final does not special-case HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form request-targets when converting HTTP/1 messages to HTTP/3 in HttpConversionUtil.toHttp3Headers. The authority-form target (e.g., &amp;#34;CONNECT trusted.example:443&amp;#34;) is parsed as a URI, so its host is emitted as :scheme, :path is set to &amp;#34;/&amp;#34;, and the HTTP/1 Host header is used as :authority; if no Host header is present the CONNECT target is dropped. In a Netty-based HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 proxy or gateway, a remote client can send a CONNECT request whose Host header names a different authority than the request-target, producing a malformed HTTP/3 CONNECT whose tunnel :authority is attacker-controlled. This can bypass tunnel allow-lists, egress policy, backend selection, or audit controls that validate the HTTP/1 CONNECT request-target before forwarding over HTTP/3. The issue is fixed in 4.2.18.Final.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Netty&amp;#39;s HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) from 4.2.2.Final through 4.2.17.Final does not special-case HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form request-targets when converting HTTP/1 messages to HTTP/3 in HttpConversionUtil.toHttp3Headers. The authority-form target (e.g., &amp;#34;CONNECT trusted.example:443&amp;#34;) is parsed as a URI, so its host is emitted as :scheme, :path is set to &amp;#34;/&amp;#34;, and the HTTP/1 Host header is used as :authority; if no Host header is present the CONNECT target is dropped. In a Netty-based HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 proxy or gateway, a remote client can send a CONNECT request whose Host header names a different authority than the request-target, producing a malformed HTTP/3 CONNECT whose tunnel :authority is attacker-controlled. This can bypass tunnel allow-lists, egress policy, backend selection, or audit controls that validate the HTTP/1 CONNECT request-target before forwarding over HTTP/3. The issue is fixed in 4.2.18.Final.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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      <title>GHSA-qmrm-mg2w-2mpw</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-qmrm-mg2w-2mpw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Netty&amp;#39;s HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) from 4.2.2.Final through 4.2.17.Final does not special-case HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form request-targets when converting HTTP/1 messages to HTTP/3 in HttpConversionUtil.toHttp3Headers. The authority-form target (e.g., &amp;#34;CONNECT trusted.example:443&amp;#34;) is parsed as a URI, so its host is emitted as :scheme, :path is set to &amp;#34;/&amp;#34;, and the HTTP/1 Host header is used as :authority; if no Host header is present the CONNECT target is dropped. In a Netty-based HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 proxy or gateway, a remote client can send a CONNECT request whose Host header names a different authority than the request-target, producing a malformed HTTP/3 CONNECT whose tunnel :authority is attacker-controlled. This can bypass tunnel allow-lists, egress policy, backend selection, or audit controls that validate the HTTP/1 CONNECT request-target before forwarding over HTTP/3. The issue is fixed in 4.2.18.Final.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Netty&amp;#39;s HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) from 4.2.2.Final through 4.2.17.Final does not special-case HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form request-targets when converting HTTP/1 messages to HTTP/3 in HttpConversionUtil.toHttp3Headers. The authority-form target (e.g., &amp;#34;CONNECT trusted.example:443&amp;#34;) is parsed as a URI, so its host is emitted as :scheme, :path is set to &amp;#34;/&amp;#34;, and the HTTP/1 Host header is used as :authority; if no Host header is present the CONNECT target is dropped. In a Netty-based HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 proxy or gateway, a remote client can send a CONNECT request whose Host header names a different authority than the request-target, producing a malformed HTTP/3 CONNECT whose tunnel :authority is attacker-controlled. This can bypass tunnel allow-lists, egress policy, backend selection, or audit controls that validate the HTTP/1 CONNECT request-target before forwarding over HTTP/3. The issue is fixed in 4.2.18.Final.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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