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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 18:51:54 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CERTFR-2026-AVI-0108 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de SUSE. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un at…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/CERTFR-2026-AVI-0108</link>
      <description>CERTFR-2026-AVI-0108</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/CERTFR-2026-AVI-0108</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2023-53989</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2023-53989</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2023-53989</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2023-53989</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-53989</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;arm64: mm: fix VA-range sanity check&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both create_mapping_noalloc() and update_mapping_prot() sanity-check
their &amp;#39;virt&amp;#39; parameter, but the check itself doesn&amp;#39;t make much sense.
The condition used today appears to be a historical accident.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The sanity-check condition:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if ((virt &amp;gt;= PAGE_END) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; (virt &amp;lt; VMALLOC_START)) {
		[ ... warning here ... ]
		return;
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;... can only be true for the KASAN shadow region or the module region,
and there&amp;#39;s no reason to exclude these specifically for creating and
updateing mappings.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When arm64 support was first upstreamed in commit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;c1cc1552616d0f35 (&amp;#34;arm64: MMU initialisation&amp;#34;)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;... the condition was:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (virt &amp;lt; VMALLOC_START) {
		[ ... warning here ... ]
		return;
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At the time, VMALLOC_START was the lowest kernel address, and this was
checking whether &amp;#39;virt&amp;#39; would be translated via TTBR1.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Subsequently in commit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;14c127c957c1c607 (&amp;#34;arm64: mm: Flip kernel VA space&amp;#34;)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;... the condition was changed to:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if ((virt &amp;gt;= VA_START) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; (virt &amp;lt; VMALLOC_START)) {
		[ ... warning here ... ]
		return;
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This appear to have been a thinko. The commit moved the linear map to
the bottom of the kernel address space, with VMALLOC_START being at the
halfway point. The old condition would warn for changes to the linear
map below this, and at the time VA_START was the end of the linear map.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Subsequently we cleaned up the naming of VA_START in commit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;77ad4ce69321abbe (&amp;#34;arm64…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;arm64: mm: fix VA-range sanity check&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both create_mapping_noalloc() and update_mapping_prot() sanity-check
their &amp;#39;virt&amp;#39; parameter, but the check itself doesn&amp;#39;t make much sense.
The condition used today appears to be a historical accident.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The sanity-check condition:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if ((virt &amp;gt;= PAGE_END) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; (virt &amp;lt; VMALLOC_START)) {
		[ ... warning here ... ]
		return;
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;... can only be true for the KASAN shadow region or the module region,
and there&amp;#39;s no reason to exclude these specifically for creating and
updateing mappings.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When arm64 support was first upstreamed in commit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;c1cc1552616d0f35 (&amp;#34;arm64: MMU initialisation&amp;#34;)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;... the condition was:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (virt &amp;lt; VMALLOC_START) {
		[ ... warning here ... ]
		return;
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At the time, VMALLOC_START was the lowest kernel address, and this was
checking whether &amp;#39;virt&amp;#39; would be translated via TTBR1.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Subsequently in commit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;14c127c957c1c607 (&amp;#34;arm64: mm: Flip kernel VA space&amp;#34;)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;... the condition was changed to:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if ((virt &amp;gt;= VA_START) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; (virt &amp;lt; VMALLOC_START)) {
		[ ... warning here ... ]
		return;
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This appear to have been a thinko. The commit moved the linear map to
the bottom of the kernel address space, with VMALLOC_START being at the
halfway point. The old condition would warn for changes to the linear
map below this, and at the time VA_START was the end of the linear map.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Subsequently we cleaned up the naming of VA_START in commit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;77ad4ce69321abbe (&amp;#34;arm64…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-53989</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-49xq-j8p7-h965</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-49xq-j8p7-h965</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;arm64: mm: fix VA-range sanity check&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both create_mapping_noalloc() and update_mapping_prot() sanity-check
their &amp;#39;virt&amp;#39; parameter, but the check itself doesn&amp;#39;t make much sense.
The condition used today appears to be a historical accident.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The sanity-check condition:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if ((virt &amp;gt;= PAGE_END) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; (virt &amp;lt; VMALLOC_START)) {
		[ ... warning here ... ]
		return;
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;... can only be true for the KASAN shadow region or the module region,
and there&amp;#39;s no reason to exclude these specifically for creating and
updateing mappings.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When arm64 support was first upstreamed in commit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;c1cc1552616d0f35 (&amp;#34;arm64: MMU initialisation&amp;#34;)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;... the condition was:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (virt &amp;lt; VMALLOC_START) {
		[ ... warning here ... ]
		return;
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At the time, VMALLOC_START was the lowest kernel address, and this was
checking whether &amp;#39;virt&amp;#39; would be translated via TTBR1.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Subsequently in commit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;14c127c957c1c607 (&amp;#34;arm64: mm: Flip kernel VA space&amp;#34;)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;... the condition was changed to:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if ((virt &amp;gt;= VA_START) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; (virt &amp;lt; VMALLOC_START)) {
		[ ... warning here ... ]
		return;
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This appear to have been a thinko. The commit moved the linear map to
the bottom of the kernel address space, with VMALLOC_START being at the
halfway point. The old condition would warn for changes to the linear
map below this, and at the time VA_START was the end of the linear map.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Subsequently we cleaned up the naming of VA_START in commit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;77ad4ce69321abbe (&amp;#34;arm64…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;arm64: mm: fix VA-range sanity check&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both create_mapping_noalloc() and update_mapping_prot() sanity-check
their &amp;#39;virt&amp;#39; parameter, but the check itself doesn&amp;#39;t make much sense.
The condition used today appears to be a historical accident.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The sanity-check condition:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if ((virt &amp;gt;= PAGE_END) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; (virt &amp;lt; VMALLOC_START)) {
		[ ... warning here ... ]
		return;
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;... can only be true for the KASAN shadow region or the module region,
and there&amp;#39;s no reason to exclude these specifically for creating and
updateing mappings.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When arm64 support was first upstreamed in commit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;c1cc1552616d0f35 (&amp;#34;arm64: MMU initialisation&amp;#34;)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;... the condition was:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (virt &amp;lt; VMALLOC_START) {
		[ ... warning here ... ]
		return;
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At the time, VMALLOC_START was the lowest kernel address, and this was
checking whether &amp;#39;virt&amp;#39; would be translated via TTBR1.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Subsequently in commit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;14c127c957c1c607 (&amp;#34;arm64: mm: Flip kernel VA space&amp;#34;)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;... the condition was changed to:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if ((virt &amp;gt;= VA_START) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; (virt &amp;lt; VMALLOC_START)) {
		[ ... warning here ... ]
		return;
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This appear to have been a thinko. The commit moved the linear map to
the bottom of the kernel address space, with VMALLOC_START being at the
halfway point. The old condition would warn for changes to the linear
map below this, and at the time VA_START was the end of the linear map.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Subsequently we cleaned up the naming of VA_START in commit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;77ad4ce69321abbe (&amp;#34;arm64…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-49xq-j8p7-h965</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2025:6966 — Red Hat Security Advisory: kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/rhsa-2025:6966</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel: xen-netfront: Fix NULL sring after live migration kernel: fscache: Fix oops due to race with cookie_lru and use_cookie kernel: tracing: Free buffers when a used dynamic event is removed kernel: net: tun: Fix use-after-free in tun_detach() kernel: hwmon: (ibmpex) Fix possible UAF when ibmpex_register_bmc() fails kernel: erofs/zmap.c: Fix incorrect offset calculation kernel: arm64/mm: fix incorrect file_map_count for non-leaf pmd/pud kernel: s390: avoid using global register for current_stack_pointer kernel: erofs: fix missing xas_retry() in fscache mode kernel: rpmsg: qcom_smd: Fix refcount leak in qcom_smd_parse_edge kernel: remoteproc: k3-r5: Fix refcount leak in k3_r5_cluster_of_init kernel: of: check previous kernel&amp;#39;s ima-kexec-buffer against memory bounds kernel: coresight: Clear the connection field properly kernel: Linux kernel: Denial of Service in coresight: trbe kernel: rpmsg: char: Avoid double destroy of default endpoint kernel: coresight: cti: Fix hang in cti_disable_hw() kernel: lib/fonts: fix undefined behavior in bit shift for get_default_font kernel: Kernel: Denial of Service in pci_endpoint_test due to zero-length DMA mapping kernel: Linux kernel: Denial of Service in erofs due to memory leak kernel: erofs: fix missing unmap if z_erofs_get_extent_compressedlen() fails kernel: pipe: wakeup wr_wait after setting max_usage kernel: ntb: intel: Fix the NULL vs IS_ERR() bug for debugfs_create_dir() kernel: qed/qed_sriov: guard against NULL derefs from qed_…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel: xen-netfront: Fix NULL sring after live migration kernel: fscache: Fix oops due to race with cookie_lru and use_cookie kernel: tracing: Free buffers when a used dynamic event is removed kernel: net: tun: Fix use-after-free in tun_detach() kernel: hwmon: (ibmpex) Fix possible UAF when ibmpex_register_bmc() fails kernel: erofs/zmap.c: Fix incorrect offset calculation kernel: arm64/mm: fix incorrect file_map_count for non-leaf pmd/pud kernel: s390: avoid using global register for current_stack_pointer kernel: erofs: fix missing xas_retry() in fscache mode kernel: rpmsg: qcom_smd: Fix refcount leak in qcom_smd_parse_edge kernel: remoteproc: k3-r5: Fix refcount leak in k3_r5_cluster_of_init kernel: of: check previous kernel&amp;#39;s ima-kexec-buffer against memory bounds kernel: coresight: Clear the connection field properly kernel: Linux kernel: Denial of Service in coresight: trbe kernel: rpmsg: char: Avoid double destroy of default endpoint kernel: coresight: cti: Fix hang in cti_disable_hw() kernel: lib/fonts: fix undefined behavior in bit shift for get_default_font kernel: Kernel: Denial of Service in pci_endpoint_test due to zero-length DMA mapping kernel: Linux kernel: Denial of Service in erofs due to memory leak kernel: erofs: fix missing unmap if z_erofs_get_extent_compressedlen() fails kernel: pipe: wakeup wr_wait after setting max_usage kernel: ntb: intel: Fix the NULL vs IS_ERR() bug for debugfs_create_dir() kernel: qed/qed_sriov: guard against NULL derefs from qed_…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/rhsa-2025:6966</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:0263-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/suse-su-2026:0263-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/suse-su-2026:0263-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2023-53989</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2023-53989</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 171 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: mm: fix VA-range sanity check Both create_mapping_noalloc() and update_mapping_prot() sanity-check their &amp;#39;virt&amp;#39; parameter, but the check itself doesn&amp;#39;t make much sense. The condition used today appears to be a historical accident. The sanity-check condition: 	if ((virt &amp;gt;= PAGE_END) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; (virt &amp;lt; VMALLOC_START)) { 		[ ... warning here ... ] 		return; 	} ... can only be true for the KASAN shadow region or the module region, and there&amp;#39;s no reason to exclude these specifically for creating and updateing mappings. When arm64 support was first upstreamed in commit:   c1cc1552616d0f35 (&amp;#34;arm64: MMU initialisation&amp;#34;) ... the condition was: 	if (virt &amp;lt; VMALLOC_START) { 		[ ... warning here ... ] 		return; 	} At the time, VMALLOC_START was the lowest kernel address, and this was checking whether &amp;#39;virt&amp;#39; would be translated via TTBR1. Subsequently in commit:   14c127c957c1c607 (&amp;#34;arm64: mm: Flip kernel VA space&amp;#34;) ... the condition was changed to: 	if ((virt &amp;gt;= VA_START) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; (virt &amp;lt; VMALLOC_START)) { 		[ ... warning here ... ] 		return; 	} This appear to have been a thinko. The commit moved the linear map to the bottom of the kernel address space, with VMALLOC_START being at the halfway point. The old condition would warn for changes to the linear map below this, and at the time VA_START was the end of the linear map. Subsequently we cleaned up the naming of VA_START in commit:   77ad4ce69321abbe (&amp;#34;arm64: memory: rename…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 171 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: mm: fix VA-range sanity check Both create_mapping_noalloc() and update_mapping_prot() sanity-check their &amp;#39;virt&amp;#39; parameter, but the check itself doesn&amp;#39;t make much sense. The condition used today appears to be a historical accident. The sanity-check condition: 	if ((virt &amp;gt;= PAGE_END) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; (virt &amp;lt; VMALLOC_START)) { 		[ ... warning here ... ] 		return; 	} ... can only be true for the KASAN shadow region or the module region, and there&amp;#39;s no reason to exclude these specifically for creating and updateing mappings. When arm64 support was first upstreamed in commit:   c1cc1552616d0f35 (&amp;#34;arm64: MMU initialisation&amp;#34;) ... the condition was: 	if (virt &amp;lt; VMALLOC_START) { 		[ ... warning here ... ] 		return; 	} At the time, VMALLOC_START was the lowest kernel address, and this was checking whether &amp;#39;virt&amp;#39; would be translated via TTBR1. Subsequently in commit:   14c127c957c1c607 (&amp;#34;arm64: mm: Flip kernel VA space&amp;#34;) ... the condition was changed to: 	if ((virt &amp;gt;= VA_START) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; (virt &amp;lt; VMALLOC_START)) { 		[ ... warning here ... ] 		return; 	} This appear to have been a thinko. The commit moved the linear map to the bottom of the kernel address space, with VMALLOC_START being at the halfway point. The old condition would warn for changes to the linear map below this, and at the time VA_START was the end of the linear map. Subsequently we cleaned up the naming of VA_START in commit:   77ad4ce69321abbe (&amp;#34;arm64: memory: rename…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2023-53989</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2025-2920 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2025-2920</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux-Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, die möglicherweise zu einer Denial-of-Service- Bedingung führen oder eine Speicherbeschädigung verursachen können.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux-Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, die möglicherweise zu einer Denial-of-Service- Bedingung führen oder eine Speicherbeschädigung verursachen können.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2025-2920</guid>
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