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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 19:18:50 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-98167 — smb: client: fix server-&gt;total_read for compound encrypted PDUs</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-98167</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb: client: fix server-&amp;gt;total_read for compound encrypted PDUs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In receive_encrypted_standard(), server-&amp;gt;total_read is left at the
full decrypted frame size when walking sub-PDUs of a compound encrypted
frame. As a result, cifs_handle_standard() passes this full size
to smb2_check_message(), causing the PDU length guards to incorrectly
validate the entire compound frame instead of the current sub-PDU.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This allows truncated non-last sub-PDUs to bypass length validation,
leading to out-of-bounds reads in smb2_get_data_area_len().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by setting server-&amp;gt;total_read to the true length of the
current sub-PDU: next_cmd for non-last sub-PDUs, and the remaining
pdu_length for the last one.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb: client: fix server-&amp;gt;total_read for compound encrypted PDUs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In receive_encrypted_standard(), server-&amp;gt;total_read is left at the
full decrypted frame size when walking sub-PDUs of a compound encrypted
frame. As a result, cifs_handle_standard() passes this full size
to smb2_check_message(), causing the PDU length guards to incorrectly
validate the entire compound frame instead of the current sub-PDU.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This allows truncated non-last sub-PDUs to bypass length validation,
leading to out-of-bounds reads in smb2_get_data_area_len().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by setting server-&amp;gt;total_read to the true length of the
current sub-PDU: next_cmd for non-last sub-PDUs, and the remaining
pdu_length for the last one.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-98167</guid>
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