<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-09-30T11:45:22.964981+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-93578</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-93578 — Io.netty/netty-handler-ssl-ocsp: netty: missing extended key usage (eku) check in ocsp client allows certificate revoca…</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T11:45:22.979957+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Red Hat build of Apache Camel for Spring Boot 4</p>
<p>A flaw was found in Netty's Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Client. The client fails to verify the 'id-kp-OCSPSigning' Extended Key Usage (EKU) in OCSP responder certificates. A remote attacker, holding any valid certificate issued by the same Certificate Authority (CA), can exploit this by forging 'GOOD' OCSP responses for revoked certificates. This bypasses certificate revocation checks, allowing applications using Netty's OCSP Client to accept certificates that should have been revoked, leading to an authorization bypass.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-93578"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
