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  <updated>2026-09-30T22:36:35.060748+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2022-49164</id>
    <title>CVE-2022-49164 — powerpc/tm: Fix more userspace r13 corruption</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T22:36:35.063371+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>powerpc/tm: Fix more userspace r13 corruption</p>
<p>Commit cf13435b730a ("powerpc/tm: Fix userspace r13 corruption") fixes a
problem in treclaim where a SLB miss can occur on the
thread_struct-&gt;ckpt_regs while SCRATCH0 is live with the saved user r13
value, clobbering it with the kernel r13 and ultimately resulting in
kernel r13 being stored in ckpt_regs.</p>
<p>There is an equivalent problem in trechkpt where the user r13 value is
loaded into r13 from chkpt_regs to be recheckpointed, but a SLB miss
could occur on ckpt_regs accesses after that, which will result in r13
being clobbered with a kernel value and that will get recheckpointed and
then restored to user registers.</p>
<p>The same memory page is accessed right before this critical window where
a SLB miss could cause corruption, so hitting the bug requires the SLB
entry be removed within a small window of instructions, which is
possible if a SLB related MCE hits there. PAPR also permits the
hypervisor to discard this SLB entry (because slb_shadow-&gt;persistent is
only set to SLB_NUM_BOLTED) although it's not known whether any
implementations would do this (KVM does not). So this is an extremely
unlikely bug, only found by inspection.</p>
<p>Fix this by also storing user r13 in a temporary location on the kernel
stack and don't change the r13 register from kernel r13 until the RI=0
critical section that does not fault.</p>
<p>The SCRATCH0 change is not strictly part of the fix, it'…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2022-49164"/>
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