Affected: picklescan

picklescan before 0.0.29 fails to detect the profile.Profile.runctx function when analyzing pickle files, allowing attackers to embed undetected malicious code. Remote attackers can craft malicious pickle files using profile.Profile.runctx in the reduce method to achieve remote code execution when the pickle file is loaded.

Affected: PyPI: picklescan

### Summary

Using profile.Profile.runctx, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file.

### Details

The attack payload executes in the following steps:

First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to profile.Profile.runctx function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.

### PoC

``` class EvilProfileRunctx: def __reduce__(self): from profile import Profile payload = "__import__('os').system('whoami')" return Profile.runctx, (Profile(), payload, {}, {}) ```

### Impact

Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.

### Corresponding

https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu