https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-09-28T11:37:43.333132+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup info@circl.lu python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-62677 CVE-2026-62677 — Omnigent: Unvalidated os_env.cwd in agent bundle yields arbitrary host filesystem access on runners without OMNIGENT_RU… 2026-09-28T11:37:43.336013+00:00

Affected: omnigent-ai omnigent

Omnigent is an open-source AI agent framework and meta-harness for orchestrating coding agents. Prior to 0.3.0, an authenticated user can upload a session-scoped agent bundle with an absolute or traversal-containing os_env.cwd value because omnigent/spec/parser.py stores the value verbatim and omnigent/spec/validator.py does not constrain it. On a runner where OMNIGENT_RUNNER_WORKSPACE is unset, omnigent/runner/resource_registry.py preserves the attacker-controlled path and omnigent/inner/os_env.py uses the resolved path as the environment root and copytree source. The _assert_within_cwd check then treats that attacker-selected root as trusted, allowing sys_os_read, write, edit, and shell tools to access runner files and environment secrets outside the intended workspace. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.0.

 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-p8rw-8qj3-hf33 GHSA-p8rw-8qj3-hf33 — Omnigent: Unvalidated os_env.cwd in agent bundle yields arbitrary host filesystem access on runners without OMNIGENT_RU… 2026-09-28T11:37:43.336251+00:00

Affected: PyPI: omnigent

### Summary

An authenticated, non-admin user can obtain **arbitrary host-filesystem read/write** (and host environment-secret disclosure) on an Omnigent **runner** by uploading an agent bundle whose `os_env.cwd` points outside any intended workspace (e.g. `/` or `/home/<victim>`). The `cwd` field is taken **verbatim** from the bundle with no validation, normalization, or boundary check anywhere in the spec pipeline.

This is a **different sink** from GHSA-jrrm-9hc7-2v3h (CWE-94, shared-agent bundle overwrite -> stdio MCP RCE). It shares the bundle-upload *vector* but is reached through the user's **own** session-scoped agent and is **not** addressed by that advisory's proposed shared-agent guard.

### Preconditions

- Runner realizes a session-scoped uploaded bundle **without** `OMNIGENT_RUNNER_WORKSPACE` set. When that env var is set (CLI- and host-launched sessions set it), the spec `cwd` is overridden and the attack is neutralized — so this is deployment-gated, not universal. - Attacker is any authenticated user (no admin scope; `_require_user` only checks identity). No shared-agent overwrite needed.

### Details (verified against code)

1. **Parse — no validation.** `omnigent/spec/parser.py:696` stores `cwd=str(cwd_raw)` verbatim. Absolute paths (`/`, `/etc`), `../..`, etc. are all accepted. The `sandbox.type` is likewise author-chosen and `"none"` is legal. 2. **Validate — cwd unconstrained.** `omnigent/spec/validator.py` `_validate_os_env` checks only fork/scratch/egr…